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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the appellate court, in discharging the Defendant from 
a sentence that was delayed, erred by also reversing the underlying 
conviction. 
3 
APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 30(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of 
conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the 
judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are not in controversy. On February 4, 
1989 the Defendant was arrested and charged with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol ("DUI"), Driving Too Fast for Existing 
Conditions, resulting in an accident, and Improper Registration. 
On February 14, 1989 the Defendant appeared before the trial court 
and entered pleas of "no contest" to the DUI and Improper 
Registration charges and not guilty to the remaining charge. 
The remaining charge was subsequently dismissed which, due to 
a clerical error, caused a delay in sentencing until January, 1990. 
The Defendant moved the trial court to dismiss due to the delay and 
the trial court denied that motion. 
The Defendant appealed that ruling to this Court and this 
Court overturned the trial court and both discharged the Defendant 
from the sentence and reversed the Defendant's conviction, that 
conviction being based on the Defendant's "no contest" plea. 
Layton City now requests this rehearing solely for the issue 
of the reversal of Defendant's conviction. 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is a dichotomy between the conviction and the subsequent 
"judgment" or "sentencing." Case law has consistently acknowledged 
this dichotomy and has also consistently held that the void or 
invalid sentence does not affect the conviction or verdict. 
Therefore, although this Court has determined the sentencing 
irregularities sufficient to discharge the Defendant therefrom, the 
Defendant's conviction should not be reversed and should be ordered 
reinstated. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLATE COURT, WHEN OVERTURNING A TRIAL 
COURT'S IMPOSITION OF A DELAYED SENTENCING, MAY 
DISCHARGE THE DEFENDANT FROM THAT SENTENCING 
BUT IS NOT TO OVERTURN THE UNDERLYING 
CONVICTION. 
The Defendant herein entered a "no contest" plea to the charge 
of DUI. This Court ruled that due to the length of delay before 
sentencing, the Defendant should be discharged therefrom. The 
Court then went on to reverse Defendant's conviction which was 
based on Defendant's plea. The Courts of this State have 
consistently separated the "conviction" from the "judgment or 
sentencing" portion of the process. Emmertson v. State Tax 
Commission, 72 P.2d 467 (Utah 1937). 
In Emmertson, the trial court's sentence was void for 
uncertainty but the Court ruled that invalidity does not void or 
vacate the conviction. Id. 
A similar determination was reached in Neilson v. Dennett, 450 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1969), wherein the Court ruled that "...the appellant 
is not relieved of the contempt simply because the sentence is 
void, and a proper sentence should be imposed if the contempt could 
be sustained." Id., at 96 (p. 170 Utah Rep. in Addendum). 
In the case of In re Flint, 71 P. 531 (Utah 1903), the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that the trial court had intentionally 
attempted to impose an indefinite sentence. Such an action 
resulted in the trial court losing jurisdiction over the Defendant. 
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Even though the trial court lost jurisdiction, the Defendant's 
conviction was not reversed. The language used by the Court was 
"discharged." Id., at 532 (p. 342, Utah Rep. in Addendum). 
The case of State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825 (Utah 1932) is 
replete with jurisprudential considerations as to maintaining the 
validity of the verdict even though the sentencing is void. "The 
contention that the sentence ... is void for the purpose of holding 
the Defendant in the custody of the warden of the state prison, 
but is valid as a discharge from the conviction under his plea of 
guilty ... is 'illogical in the last degree.'" Id., at 826-827 
(pp. 72, 73 Utah Rep. in Addendum), citing Ex parte Smith, 152 Cal. 
566, 93 P. 191. 
"Here the conviction was valid, but the sentence was void. 
The void sentence created no rights, nor did it impair or affect 
any right. The case stood as if no sentence had been imposed, and 
jurisdiction of the district court continued until a valid judgment 
was imposed. This must be true, unless by mere lapse of time or 
because of the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 9041, 
the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case and person of 
the Defendant." Lee Lim, supra., at 827 (p. 74, Utah Rep. in 
Addendum). This is precisely on point with the case at bar. The 
conviction was valid, and this Court ruled the sentence void. This 
Court ruled that the trial court, by the mere lapse of time, lost 
jurisdiction over the Defendant. This, however, does not and 
should not automatically result in the conviction being reversed. 
Just as "It shocks one's conception of good sense and justice 
8 
to say that a person who has been lawfully convicted of a crime 
should be relieved from serving the sentence provided by law 
because the court erred in pronouncing sentence," Id., at 827 (74, 
Utah Rep. in Addendum), so it shocks one's conception of good sense 
and judgment to say one who was convicted upon his own plea should 
have the conviction reversed based on an independent sentencing 
irregularity. 
The Court in Lee Lim quoted Mr. Justice Field in the case of 
In Re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149: "The 
common law embodies in itself sufficient reason and common sense 
to reject the monstrous doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is 
established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment 
altogether because the court committed error in passing the 
sentence." Id., at 828 (77, 78 Utah Rep. in Addendum). 
It should be noted that even the dissenting opinion in Lee 
Lim, concludes with "I am of the opinion that the judgment and 
sentence appealed from should be reversed, and the Defendant 
discharged." Id. (emphasis added). Clearly indicating the verdict 
was to remain. 
The City would urge this Court to reconsider its reversal of 
the Defendant's legal and proper conviction. Further, if the Court 
would also reconsider Defendant's complete discharge from 
sentencing and order a modification thereof pursuant to Rule 30(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully requests that this Court grant the 
Petition for rehearing and reconsider the reversal of the 
Defendant's conviction. That conviction is based upon the 
Defendant's own plea and should remain intact. Such convictions 
should stand regardless of the nature of sentencing irregularities, 
particularly when they are as unintentional and absent malice as 
herein. This Court should modify its order and modify or discharge 
Defendant from the sentence but order that the conviction stand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is^S~ day of September, 1990. 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing if presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing was mailed to Defendant/Appellant's 
Attorney, Stanley M. Smedley, BEAN & SMEDLEY, 190 South Fort Lane, 
Suite 2, Layton, Utah 84041 on this ^ S day of September, 1990, 
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ADDENDUM 
12 
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directly to the purchaser is in interstate commerce and 
does not consthute doing business wiHrin the state so 1 
as to subject theSqorporation to the stahrte prescrib-
ing conditions appnraible to foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the stateS^Advance-Rumely Thrbsher Co., Inc., 
V. Stohl, 75 Utah 124, 288UP. 731. It is ageneralWe that: 
\ " T h e mere soliciting and obtaining of orders within a stata by the 
agbnt of a foreign corporation, fo^goods to be shipped into theSstate 
to tHfcpurchasers, do not amount tc\doing business within the sfe^e 
so as to\j*ender the corporation amenabi^to service of process therein." 
Note, 10ISJL L. R. 133; People's Tobacc\Co.t Ltd., v. American To-
bacco Co., 2*6 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L N M . 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 
537; Curlee (Xothing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Gbmm. (Okl. Sup.) 68 P. 
(2d) 834. \ \ 
The facts alleged in the petition and admitted by demurrer 
bring this case wrbhin the rule stated. The alxfernative writ 
of prohibition heretofore issued is made permaneht prohibit-
ing and restraining the^istrict court of Beaver couirbv 
and the judge thereof frHm proceeding further with \ . 2 
said cause against Parke, iJsms & Co. except to quash \, 
the service of summons therein. Costs to plaintiff. 
EPHRAIM HANSON, MOFFAT, WOLFE, and LAR-
SON, JJ., concur. 
EMMERTSON v. STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
No. 5898. Decided October 13, 1937. (72 P. [2d] 467.) 
1. CRIMINAL LAW. In prosecution for driving automobile while under 
influence of intoxicating liquor, judgment reading "Sentence im-
posed, $100 or thirty days," was void for uncertainty, and no 
further valid proceedings could be based on the judgment as such.1 
2. CRIMINAL LAW. The judgment or sentence of court in a criminal 
action is not the same or identical with the verdict, and, although 
the judgment pronounced upon verdict may be void, the verdict 
may still be valid, and a judgment in a criminal case, void for 
iRasmussen V. Zundell, 67 Utah 456, 248 P. 135; Frankey v. Patten, 
75 Utah 231, 284 P. 318. 
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uncertainty, does not vacate and set aside the verdict and con-
viction.2 
3. AUTOMOBILES. Where motorist had been found guilty of driv-
ing an automobile while under influence of intoxicating liquor, 
but judgment entered by court was void for uncertainty, verdict of 
conviction and finding of guilty were still valid and authorized' 
State Tax Commission's suspension of motorist's automobile 
driver's license (Laws 1933, c. 45, §§ 17, 18, 20, as amended by 
Laws 1935, c. 47). 
4. AUTOMOBILES. The revoking of automobile driver's license is 
mandatory upon State Tax Commission upon receipt of a record of 
conviction of driving motor vehicle while under influence of in-
toxicating liquor, and is not founded upon any order or judgment 
of court (Laws 1933, c. 45, §§ 17, 18, 20, as amended by Laws 
1935, c. 47). 
5. AUTOMOBILES. The court may suspend execution of any judgment 
or sentence it imposes upon one convicted of driving motor ve-
hicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, but revocation of 
v license to drive automobile still takes effect, since court cannot 
suspend the result of conviction (Laws 1933, c. 45, §§ 17, 18, 20, 
as amended by Laws 1935, c. 47). 
6. STATUTES. Unless the contrary appears, the terms of legislative 
enactments must be taken in their ordinary and usual signifi-
cance as they are generally understood among mankind. 
7. CRIMINAL LAW. The word "conviction," in its popular sense, 
means no more than a verdict of guilty. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of "Convicted; Convic-
tion," see Words & Phrases.] 
8. AUTOMOBILES. The word "conviction" as used in statute requir-
ing State Tax Commission to revoke automobile driver's license 
upon receipt of record of conviction means verdict of guilty, and 
does not include sentence or judgment (Laws 1933, c. 45, §§ 17, 
18, 20, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 47). 
9. AUTOMOBILES. Word "record" as used in statute requiring State 
Tax Commission to revoke automobile driver's license upon re-
ceiving record of conviction of the licensee must be given its 
2State v. Cat-men, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670; Mutart v. Prwtt, 51 
Utah 246, 170 P. 67; Frankey v. Patten, lb Utah 231, 284 P. 318. 
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popular meaning rather than a technical meaning, and therefore 
means a statement by the court showing the facts essential to put 
into operation the action of the commission in making proper en-
tries showing the license revoked (Laws 1933, c. 45, §§ 17, 18, 
20, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 47). 
A "record" is a written memorial made by a public officer 
authorized by law to perform that function, and intended to 
serve as evidence of something written, said, or done. It is a 
written account of some act, transaction, or instrument, 
drawn up, under authority of law, by a proper officer, and 
designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence of 
the matters to which it relates. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of "Record," see Words 
& Phrases.] 
10. AUTOMOBILES. All that court, in which motorist is convicted of 
offense requiring revocation of license, is required to transmit to 
State Tax Commission, is such record or report as shows name of 
court, the charge, the date of trial, and the verdict, so the proper 
entries can be made showing the license revoked and the proper 
and sufficient reasons therefor (Laws 1933, c. 45, § 18, as amend-
ed by Laws 1935, c. 47). 
11. AUTOMOBILES. Where motorist had been found guilty in city court 
of driving automobile while under influence of intoxicating liquor, 
and the judge of the city court reported to the State Tax Com-
mission that motorist had been convicted in that court of drunken 
driving, the report transmitted to the commission was sufficient 
to require the commission to perform the ministerial act of mak-
ing proper entry showing motorist's automobile driver's license 
had been revoked, notwithstanding the judgment entered by the 
court was void for uncertainty (Laws 1933, c. 45, § 18, as amended 
by Laws 1935, c. 47). 
Original certiorari proceeding by Louis F. Emmertson 
against the State Tax Commission of Utah, to review the 
action of the commission in suspending plaintiff's automobile 
driver's license. 
COMMISSION'S ACTION AFFIRMED. 
A. A. Duncan and La Mar Duncan, both of Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
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Ned Warnock, of Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
LARSON, Justice. 
This action arises upon certiorari to the State Tax Com-
mission, issued upon petition of plaintiff, to review the ac-
tion of the commission in suspending the automobile driver's 
license of plaintiff. The application is based upon the follow-
ing facts, none of which are in dispute: On December 1, 
1936, in the city court of Salt Lake City, plaintiff was found 
guilty of driving an automobile while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. The judgment of the court was, "I 
find the defendant guilty and sentence him to pay a fine of 
$100.00 or serve thirty days in the city jail." The docket en-
try, of said judgment reads, "Sentence imposed $100.00 or 
thirty days." The judge of the city court reported to the com-
mission that plaintiff herein had been convicted in that court 
of drunken driving. On December 24,1936, the Tax Commis-
sion made an order suspending the driver's license of the 
plaintiff and sent him a communication advising him that 
his driver's license had been suspended for forty-five days, 
and stating, "if no appeal is taken, said license will be auto-
matically revoked for a period of one year," and demanding 
that plaintiff return his operator's license to the commission. 
Plaintiff refused to surrender his license and sued out this 
writ to review the action of the commission. 
Plaintiff assails the order of the commission, as without 
jurisdiction, null and void for the following reasons: (1) 
That the judgment of the city court, in the case wherein 
plaintiff was found guilty of driving an automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was a void judg-
ment; (2) that the judgment of the city court contained no 
requirement that plaintiff surrender his operator's license 
for suspension or revocation, and therefore the commission 
had no authority to do so; (3) that the Tax Commission had 
before it no proper evidence upon which to base its order of 
suspension. 
We shall examine these contentions in their order: 
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(1) As far as the record before us shows the facts, this 
proposition that the judgment was void must be re-
solved in favor of the plaintiff. The record before us is 1 
simple. The petition alleges that the court announced 
orally, "I find the defendant guilty and sentence him to pay 
a fine of $100.00 or serve thirty days in the City Jail," and 
there is no record of the judgment except the minute entry, 
"Sentence imposed, $100 or thirty days." The foregoing is 
admitted by the Tax Commission and their return to the writ 
shows that the report from the city court on which they 
acted reads, "Sentence imposed, $100.00 or thirty days." 
Such a judgment is void for uncertainty, has no validity, and 
no further valid proceedings can be based upon the judg-
ment as such. Rasrrmssen V. Zundell, 67 Utah 456, 248 P. 
135; Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231,284 P. 318; In re Lange, 
18 Wall 163, 21 L. Ed. 872; Ex Parte Page, 49 Mo. 291; Ex 
parte Martini, 23 Fla. 343, 345, 2 So. 689, 690; 8 R. C. L., 
§ 237, p. 237; Hurd on Habeas Corpus, pp. 327-329; Freeman 
on Judgments, § 625. 
But it does not follow that the deductions plaintiff makes 
from the premise are well taken. Plaintiff argues that the 
commission has no power to suspend or revoke a driver's 
license except upon a certified copy of a valid judgment of 
conviction of violation of some provision of the law govern-
ing the operation of motor vehicles. This involves a con-
struction of some provisions of the statutes. As far as ma-
terial here, those provisions are found in sections 17, 18, 
and 20, c. 45, Laws Utah 1933, as amended by chapter 47, 
Laws of Utah 1935. Section 17 provides that, whenever a 
person is convicted of any offense for which the revocation 
of his operator's or chauffeur's license is mandatory, the 
court shall require the surrender to it of the license and 
forward the same, with the record of conviction, to the Tax 
Commission. Section 18 provides: 
"The department [Tax Commission] shall forthwith revoke the li-
cense of any person upon receiving a record of the conviction of such 
person of any of the following crimes:" 
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Then follow five offenses, among which are: 
"2. Driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or narcotic drug." 
The section makes mandatory the revocation of the li-
cense upon proof of conviction of any of the offenses enum-
erated therein, without notice to the holder of the license 
and without discretion or judgment on the part of the 
commission. The act of revoking is ministerial only and 
is mandatory upon the commission. 
Plaintiff argues that, the judgment being void, it could 
not form the basis for the act of revoking the license, and 
therefore the action of the commission was void, and that 
the judgment contained no requirement that the license be 
surrendered and revoked. But plaintiff overlooks the 
fact that judgment or sentence of the court in a crim- 2, 3 
inal action is not the same or identical with the ver-
dict; and although the judgment of the court, pronounced 
upon the verdict, may be void, the verdict may still be valid, 
and a judgment in a criminal case, void for uncertainty, does 
not vacate and set aside the verdict and conviction. Said 
this court in State v. Carmen, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670, 672, 
wherein the court had imposed an erroneous sentence: "For 
the reasons hereinbefore stated, the verdict of the jury must 
therefore be, and the same is, in all respects held legal and 
just. The sentence, however, which was imposed by the 
district court of Wasatch county is set aside and annulled, 
and the case is remanded to that court, with directions to c 
require the appellant to appear before it and to impose a I 
sentence upon him as provided" by law. See, also, Mutart 1 
v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67; Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 
231, 284 P. 318. It follows therefore that, although the sen- g 
tence or judgment of the court was void for uncertainty, the c 
verdict of conviction and the finding of guilty are still valid 
and subsisting. \" 
(2) The statute nowhere provides that the court, as a part ei 
of its judgment, must revoke or order revoked the license he 
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of the person convicted. It simply provides that the court 
shall require the surrender to it of all of the operator's and 
chauffeur's licenses then held by the person convicted, 
and forward the same with the record of such con- 4, 5 
viction to the Tax Commission. Section 17, supra. 
It is then provided that the commission "shall forthwith 
revoke the license of any person upon receiving a record of 
the conviction of such person." Section 18, supra. It is evi-
dent therefore that the revoking of the license is mandatory 
on the commission upon receipt of a record of the conviction, 
and is not founded upon any order or judgment of the court. 
The court may suspend execution of any judgment or sen-
tence it imposes on one convicted, but the revocation of the 
license still takes effect. The court cannot suspend that 
result of conviction because it is no part of the court's judg-
ment; it is a result imposed by law mandatorily. 
(3) The only question remaining then is : Was the record 
of conviction such as to invoke the ministerial duty of the 
Commission? Plaintiff argues that the abbreviated report 
to the commission was not a record of conviction, and, to 
invoke action by the commission, it must have a "pre-
cise written history of the case from its commence- 6-8 
ment to its termination." The statute does not say 
that the commission must have a certified copy of the record 
of the court pertaining to the case. It simply says that, 
"upon receiving a record of the conviction," the commission 
shall make the order on its records showing the license 
revoked. What then constitutes a "record of conviction" 
under this statute? The difficulty encountered here is due 
to the fact that the word "conviction" is of equivocal mean-
ing. In some cases it is held to include the verdict and 
judgment; in other cases it implies nothing more than a find-
ing of guilty. It has a popular as well as a technical mean-
ing. The question is, In what sense was the term "convic-
tion" used in the legislative enactment? Unless the contrary-
appears, the terms of legislative enactments must be taken 
in their ordinary and usual significance as they are generally 
8 
226 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH [October 
Emmertson v. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 219 
understood among mankind. The word "conviction," in its 
popular sense, means no more than a verdict of guilty. The 
common and ordinary mode of expression to indicate the 
successful prosecution of a crime marks the distinction. We 
almost invariably use the phrase that "He has been convicted 
and sentenced." The conviction and sentence are each in 
turn liable to be attacked and tested separately, one for 
errors in the trial, the other for errors in the judgment. 
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 362, says, "If a 
jury find him guilty, he is then said to be convicted of the 
crime whereof he stands indicted." Accordingly, he divides 
the processes of a prosecution into separate chapters. One he 
designates "Of Trial and Conviction"; another, "Of Judg-
ment and Its Consequences." He further says, "The next 
stage of a criminal prosecution after the trial and convic-
tion is that of judgment." We think that in this sense the 
word "conviction" is used in the statute. The cases which 
hold that a "conviction" involves and requires also a sentence 
or judgment before it is a conviction are cases where a 
more severe penalty is provided for a second offense. In 
such it has generally been held that the person must also 
have been sentenced under the former verdict to make it a 
former conviction, because the more severe penalty is pro-
vided upon the theory that the first penalty was insufficient 
to cure or check the tendency to do the unlawful, and only 
because the penalty on first conviction is not severe enough 
to checkmate the criminal tendency is a second offense made 
a more serious crime. The distinctions so indicated clearly 
appear in the cases. Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 
362, 363, 73 A. 427; State V. Brown, 115 Mo. 409,22 S. W. 367; 
York County v. DaZhausen, 45 Pa. 372; Wilmoth V. Hensel, 
15 L Pa. 200, 25 A. 86, 31 Am. St. Rep. 738; Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 69; Muckenfuss V. State, 
55 Tex. Cr. R. 216,117 S. W. 853; 3 Coke's Institutes (Thom-
as) 559; Wharton, Law Lexicon. And so it has been held 
that, where sentence was suspended or a pardon granted 
after verdict but before sentence pronounced, defendant still 
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had been convicted. Agnew v. Commissioners, 12 Serg. & R. 
(Pa.) 94; Cope v. Commonwealth, 4 Casey (28 Pa.) 297. 
We hold therefore that the invalidity of the judgment or 
sentence does not void the "conviction" as that term is used 
in the statute here under consideration. 
Was, then, the report transmitted to the commission from 
the police court a "record of conviction/' within the mean-
ing of the statute so as to be a basis for the entry of an order 
revoking the license by the commission? "Record" is an-
other word of equivocal meaning. Thus, the record of 
a trial or proceeding, when applied to appeals and 9 
judicial proceedings, has a rather definite, technical 
meaning. Likewise, in speaking of the records of a legis-
lative body or of a public office, another definite but tech-
nical meaning is given to the word. Then, too, the word has 
a popular connotation. Thus, one may say that the news-
paper gave a complete and accurate or an erroneous record of 
the events; and we may speak of a family record. We think 
the word as used in this statute must be given its popular 
meaning rather than a technical legal meaning. It here 
means a statement by the court showing the facts essential 
to put into operation the action of the commission in making 
the proper entries showing the license revoked. 
A record is defined by Bouvier as "a written memorial 
made by a public officer authorized by law to perform that 
function, and intended to serve as evidence of something 
written, said, or done." Black's Law Dictionary defines it 
as "a written account of some act, transaction, or instru-
ment, drawn up, under authority of law, by a proper officer, 
and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence 
of the matters to which it relates." Downing v. Brown, 3 
Colo. 571. 
"That which is written or transcribed to perpetuate a knowledge 
of the acts or events; reduction to writing as evidence; also the writ-
ing so made." Webster's New International Dictionary. 
"To record means to transcribe; to write an authentic account of." 
People ex rel v. Haas, 311 111. 164, 142 N. E. 549, 550. 
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Had the Legislature intended to require a certified copy 
of the court's register or docket, it could readily have so 
provided. But such was not done, and we see no reason why 
it should be necessary. We have already shown that the 
revocation is mandatory; that the act of the commis-
sion is merely ministerial under section 18, supra, of 10,11 
the act; that the statute itself voids the license upon 
conviction. All therefore, that can be necessary is for the 
court to transmit in writing to the commission such record 
or report as to show the name of the court, the charge, the 
date of trial and the verdict, so the proper entries can be 
made showing the license revoked and the proper and suffi-
cient reasons therefor. The report or record transmitted 
to the commission in this case met all these requirements. 
The Tax Commission, therefore, acted within its proper 
authority in revoking plaintiffs license, and its action is 
therefore affirmed. 
FOLLAND, C. J., and HANSON, MOFFAT, and WOLFE, 
JJ., concur. 
STATE v. TELFORD. 
No. 5630. Decided October 18, 1937. (72 P. [2d] 626.) 
1. COURTS. A court may have jurisdiction of a subject-matter, but 
its jurisdiction should be properly invoked. 
2. COURTS. To invoke original jurisdiction of district court, a party 
must file a complaint, petition, or application, and not simply 
state his complaint orally. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW. As respects misdemeanors, jurisdiction of district 
court can be invoked only by appeal, or if it appears by certifi-
cate that there is no justice of the peace in the county qualified 
to try the case. 
4. CRIMINAL LAW. Where city judge, who was justice of the peace 
ex officio, certified misdemeanor case to district court without 
trial on motion of accused, which was not objected to by county 
attorney, without finding that city judge was disqualified or that 
1 0 6 22 UTAH ! 
here involved is Cosmopolitan Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio^RR. Co.4 There 
the driver of a delivery truhk was injured 
from falling on defective flooring while 
carrying a box into a receiving a\ea. The 
court cn\cussed and placed some erta)hasis 
on the question of causation. It poWed 
out in respec\to the "loading and unload-
ing" clause that the "complete operation 
test" does not goSso far as to require a 
holding that coverage is extended to all 
accidents occurring dufmg the period of 
unloading whether causahV related to the 
unloading or not.5 \ 
WKare in agreement with the\ruling of 
the tr iai court that under the facte here 
shown, wh\re the cause of the injury\was 
negligence irr^he maintenance of the m a ^ 
ket, and whereNmch causative negligence 
had no connection vsith the truck itself, the 
insurance of United Pacific upon the mar-
K^t, and not that of Employers' Liability 
upoo^he truck, should be rtearded as the 
primarKinsurance held responsible for the 
loss. \^ \ . 
Affirmed. %osts to defendants (respond-
ents). \^ ^ 
CALLISTER, ELE^TT, and TUCK-
ETT, JJ., concur. \ 
HENROID, J., concurs in r ta result. 
4. 18 A D.2d 460, 240 N.Y.S.2d 88. \ 
REPOETS 
450 P.2d 93 
A. P. NEILSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Herta K. DENNETT, Defendant, 
John Elwood Dennett, Intervenor and 
Appeiiant. 
No. 11032. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 31, 1969. 
Intervenor was found guilty of con-
tempt The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, D. F. Wilkins, J., rendered a judg-
ment, and the intervenor appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that it was 
incumbent on District Court to find that 
intervenor at time order was made to pay 
over $1,500 to receiver had the ability to 
pay over the $1,500 and thereafter refused 
to do so before District Court could hold in-
tervenor in contempt for failure to pay, and 
where District Court did not do so, con-
tempt charge could not be sustained. 
Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Callister and Henriod, JJ., dissented. 
!. Receivers <§=*42 
Where receiver was appointed to serve 
without bond required by statute, appoint-
ment was erroneous but was not void. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 66(d). 
5. Id. at 240 N.Y.S.2d 91. See also cases 
cited therein; and cf. a similar case, 
Clark v. Travelers Indem. Co., C.A.7, 313 
F.2d 160. 
NEILSON v. DENNETT 
Cite as 22 Utah 2d 166 
2. Appeal and Error <&=>934(2) 
Ordinarily, reviewing courts will pre-
sume that trial court was correct in its 
judgment and that there was evidence to 
sustain its findings unless record shows to 
contrary. 
167 
3. Receivers <§=>72 
It was incumbent on trial court to find 
that intervenor at time order was made to 
pay over $1,500 to receiver had the ability 
to pay over the $1,500 and thereafter re-
fused to do so before trial court could hold 
intervenor in contempt for failure to pay, 
and where trial court did not do so, con-
tempt charge could not be sustained. U. 
C.A.1953, 78-32-10; Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, rule 52(a). 
4. Receivers <&=>72 
Intervenor could not be held in con-
tempt for failure to account to receiver for 
$300, where record, though quite volumi-
nous, made no mention of the $300 prior to 
the order holding the intervenor in con-
tempt. U.C.A.1953, 78-32-10. 
5. Contempt <§=»63(2) 
Sentence for contempt that intervenor 
serve five days in jail or alternatively pay 
a fine in sum of $200 is void for uncertain-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 78-32-10. 
John Elwood Dennett, pro se, 
Dudley Amoss, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent. 
ELLETT, Justice. 
On September 13, 1967, the trial court 
ordered appellant "forthwith to turn over 
to the receiver the sum of $1,500.00 which 
he has heretofore collected as advance 
rentals and to account to the receiver for 
the difference between the amounts actual-
ly collected and the $1,500.00 to be ten-
dered to the receiver." 
The receiver's affidavit dated September 
14, 1967, states that appellant had failed to 
pay to him the $1,500.00. 
Under date of September 14, 1967, the 
court issued an order to show cause order-
ing appellant to appear "and show cause, 
if any he has, why he should not be pun-
ished for contempt of court in failing to 
obey the said Order" [of September 13, 
1967]. 
The trial court held appellant in con-
tempt for failure to pay the sum of $1,500.-
00 or any part thereof personally collected 
by him as advance rentals and for failure 
to render an accounting to the receiver for 
the additional sum of $300.00, also collect-
ed by him, and sentenced him "to serve 
five (5) days imprisonment in the Salt Lake 
County Jail, or in the alternative to pay a 
fine in the sum of $500.00; * * * " The 
next day the court amended its sentence as 
follows: 
And it appearing to the Court that the 
fine imposed on the said John Elwood 
1 6 8 22 UTAH : 
Dennett was in excess of the jurisdiction 
of the Court, 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court, upon 
its own motion, amends its Order dated 
September 20, 1967 in the following re-
spects : 
1. The fine heretofore imposed upon 
John Elwood Dennett as an alternative 
to imprisonment for five days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, is herewith reduced 
from $500.00 to $200.00.* 
* * * * * * 
The appellant claims that he is excused 
from complying with the order requiring 
him to turn money over to the receiver for 
three reasons, namely: (1) The receiver 
was not authorized to collect money. (2) 
Appellant had spent the money and was, 
therefore, unable to comply with the order. 
(3) The order as made was illegal. 
We will examine the three claims in the 
order set out. 
Rule 66(d), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, provides: 
Before entering upon his duties a re-
ceiver must be sworn to perform them 
faithfully, and with one or more sureties, 
approved by the court, execute an under-
taking to such persons and in such sum as 
the court may direct, to the effect that 
I. The punishment for contempt in the dis-
trict court is prescribed by Sec. 78-32-10, 
U.C.A.1953, as follows: " * * * and 
if it is adjudged that he is guilty of the 
contempt, a fine may be imposed upon 
. REPORTS 
he will faithfully discharge the duties of 
receiver in the action and obey the orders 
of the court therein. [Emphasis added.] 
Here the court did not fix the amount of 
the bond but instead and contrary to the 
rule quoted he ordered that the receiver 
serve without bond. The appellant made no 
request to have a bond fixed by the court 
and never appealed from the order as made. 
Instead, he relies upon the failure to fur-
nish a bond as an excuse for not comply-
ing with the order of the court The law 
is set out in 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 76 as 
follows : 
* * * [Ejxcept in a few jurisdic-
tions, an order not requiring the receiver 
to give security is not void, nor, in the 
absence of a statute requiring a bond, is 
it erroneous as a matter of law; and, 
when the order of appointment does not 
require the receiver to give a bond, a fail-
ure to give one is not fatal, even in a 
jurisdiction wherein a statute provides 
that a receiver must execute and file a 
bond before entering on his duties. 
* * * [Emphasis added.] 
[1] The receiver was an arm of the 
court, and the appointment, although er-
roneous, was not void. This claim is with-
out merit. 
him not exceeding $200, or he may be 
imprisoned in the county jail not ex-
ceeding thirty days, or he may be both 
fined and imprisoned; * * * " 
NEILSON v. DENNETT 
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[2,3] The appellant claims in his brief 
and orally argued before this court that he 
had already spent the money before the 
hearing was held in the contempt matter, 
while counsel for respondent stated that 
appellant had the money in his pocket at 
the time of the hearing. The record of 
testimony was not brought before us, and 
so we cannot say who is correct. Ordi-
narily, appellate courts will presume that 
the trial court was correct in its judgment 
and that there was evidence to sustain its 
findings unless the record shows to the 
contrary. However, in this case it was in-
cumbent upon the trial court to find that 
the appellant at the time the order was 
made had the ability to pay over the money 
and thereafter refused to do so before the 
judge could hold the appellant in contempt 
for failure to pay.2 This the court did not 
do. It made no finding as to whether the 
appellant had the ability to comply with 
the order or not. The contempt charge 
cannot be sustained insofar as it is based 
upon failure to pay the $1,500.00. 
[4] If the contempt charge was based 
upon a failure to "render" an accounting 
for the $300.00, then the defendant could 
be held in contempt until he complied with 
the order of the court, provided, however, 
that the pleadings would sustain a finding 
of contempt. The record is quite volumi-
nous, and from our inspection thereof we 
cannot find any mention of $300.00 prior 
to the order holding appellant in contempt 
Under the holding of this court in Bott v. 
Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968), 
appellant could not be held in contempt on 
such a record. 
The appellant has had law training but 
is not a member of the Bar, and his brief 
does not comply with the rules of this 
court. In fact, it is rather difficult to 
know what he contends to be illegal about 
the order made by the court below. While 
he did not specifically claim that the order 
as made was uncertain, nevertheless, we 
think it is void for uncertainty, and we 
should take notice of the situation so as to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
[5] The sentence as amended was that 
the appellant serve five days in jail or al-
ternatively pay a fine in the sum of $200.-
00. Such a sentence is void for uncertain-
ty under prior holdings of this court. In 
the case of Rasmussen v. Zundel, 67 Utah 
456, 248 P. 135 (1926), the defendant was 
sentenced to pay a fine of $200 or spend 
90 days in the county jail. This court said 
at page 462 of the Utah Reports; at page 
137 of 248 P.: 
* * * [T]he court apparently left 
it to the defendant or to the sheriff to 
determine which sentence should be im-
posed. It is elementary that judgment, 
2. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah. 505, 514, 260 P.2d 544; Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.; 17 C.J.S. Con-
tempt § 85(s). 
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especially in criminal cases, should be 
• definite, and ministerial officers should 
not be left in doubt as to what sentence 
is to be imposed. * * * 
T h e Rasmussen case was followed by 
the case of Emmer tson v. State T a x Com-
mission, 93 Utah 219, 72 P.2d 467, 113 A. 
L.R. 1174 (1937), wherein the court sen-
tenced the defendant to pay a fine of $100 
or serve 30 days in the < OJP..I V >,H At p a p 
223 of the I Jtnh Reports at page 4o8 <--i 
72 P.2d this court held "Such a judgmer* 
is void for uncertainty, has no validity, and 
no fur ther valid proceedings »•••; iw Kisec 
upoj :ht nv1."*•.' i;' -r -; :• 
7 he --ase\ r}r,--\ above show tha t the ap-
\••''-];.•.*• •- s^ not relieved of the contempt sim-
ply because the sentence is void, and . 
proper sentence should be imposed : '.: 
contempt could be sustained. 
In view of our holding- that it does not 
appear that the appellant had the ability to 
t u rn the money over, the sentence as now 
imposed cannot be sustained, and the judg-
ment holding him in contempt is reversed. 
T h e case is remanded to the district court 
for such further proceedings in harmony 
wi th this opinion as may be proper. 
( k O C K F T I , < i , ;md T U C K E T T , 
I,» concur, 
1
 * : J. * • « j / ; disheriting). 
1 am compelled :• !>-^-i-; horn the u-v 
jor i tv opinion. The urn.' sequence of t'n 
ilKv -tlli?. 
re levant proceedings in the instant is im 
por tant . 
By an order of September 13, 1967, Join I 
Elwood IVEJ: , I-H \ u s .-<rdered forthwith to 
turn o v ! t'- the r r r c i v e r the sum of $1500 
which he had beic i - . fore collected as ad-
vanced rentaK and *.» account to the i > 
ceiver ft J . / J . »;I* . >"ence between the 
amount, a, anally collected and the $1500 to 
• . rndcrcu : • the receiver, 
mplicit wi th in this o rde r is the obvious 
i;i:-hng that Denne t t h a d disposed of some 
oi the advanced renta ls tha t he had col-
l a t e d , ?V; '.\hi«-h the cour t ordered an ac-
count ing, a n d t ha t he still exercised do-
minion over t he r emain ing $1500. 
•* »n S c p t e m ' > i 1-i 1{'0, , ."•! •-• =-h. 
"' • receiver , by aff idavi t , sv,. •- that I -cn-
- it had failed to pay the $1500 or U -~m-
{;*> \ him in respect to said payment. 
On September 14, 1967, tin court >sued 
an order to show cause, if av.y, \vh\ Den-
net t should not be punished -.-r oon'^mpt 
of court in fai l ing to obey the court ' s or-
der. T h e o rde r reci ted tha* Dennet t had 
been ordered on Sep tember 13, 19*v\ to 
make payment to Alvin I. >'-o:h. OI- • .?• be-
fore 10:00 a. m., Sep tember 14, 1967, that 
payment h a d not been made, and that Den-
net t had failed to comply with the order of 
the court or satisfactorily r r<»sv himself 
and was thereby ;n corner; • 
On Sep tember 3) , 1967, ihe court issued 
an order v\!nch recited tine* a hear ing upon 
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' the show cause order had been held on Sep-
tember 18, 1967, and that it was ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that Dennett had 
wilfully disobeyed the order of the court 
in that he had failed to pay the sum of 
$1500 or any part thereof personally col-
lected as advance rentals and, further, that 
he had failed to render an accounting to the 
receiver, Alvin L Smith, for the additional 
sum of $300, also collected by him, which 
willful disobedience constituted contempt 
of the prior order of this court. 
The majority opinion asserts that it can-
not find any mention in the record of the 
accounting of $300 prior to the order 
holding appellant in contempt. Appellant 
admits that he collected advanced rentals 
in the sum of $1800. In the order of Sep-
tember 13, 1967, appellant was ordered to 
account for the difference between the 
amounts actually collected and $1500, sub-
sequently, the order specifically identified 
the difference as $300., There is upon this 
state of facts a sufficient basis to support 
the judgment of the trial court. 
The majority opinion further states that 
it was incumbent upon the trial court to 
find that the appellant at the time the order 
was made had the ability to pay over the 
money and thereafter refused before ap-
pellant could be found in contempt for 
failure to pay. 
I. 85 Utah 94, 38 P.2d 753 (1934). 
In State v. Bartholomew,1 appellant ap-
pealed from a judgment of contempt on the 
ground that the evidence showed that de-
fendant's failure to pay was not willful 
but was due to inability. This court re-
versed the trial court because its findings 
merely asserted the defendant was found 
in contempt of court for not making any 
payments to the complaining witness, and 
no finding was made in respect of defend-
ant's ability to pay. This court observed 
that a person not able to comply with the 
order of the court as to the payment of 
money cannot be found guilty of contempt. 
The failure to comply with the order must 
be willful "and this presupposes an ability 
to comply with the order or judgment." 
The instant action is readily distinguish-
able from the Bartholomew case as Judge 
Wilkins specifically found that appellant 
willfully disobeyed the order of the court, 
and this "willfulness" connotes an abil-
ity to pay. Furthermore, inability to per-
form is a defense, and appellant had the 
burden of persuading the court.2 It should 
be observed that in the order of September 
14, 1967, the court stated that appellant 
had failed to comply with the order or sat-
isfactorily excuse himself. In addition, 
the original order of September 13, 1967, 
excused the appellant from turning over 
funds, which he evidently informed the 
court he no longer possessed, and merely 
2. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 505, 511, 260 
P.2d 544 (1953). 
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ordered him to account for them. There is held Kaat purported arbitrary assessment in 
absolutely no evidence before this court to name oX corporation's president, in rela-
indicate that appellant sustained his bur- tion to personal property not owned by him, 
den of proof that he was unable to pay; which was norther seen nor actually ap-
and, therefore, the trial court's finding' of praised by the assessor, was but an erronc-
willfulness must be sustained. Judgment ous and ineffectualNattempt through a sub 
of the trial court should be affirmed with stitute expedient procedure to collect tax 
a remand to the trial court for the imposi-
tion of a valid sentence. 
HENRIOD, J., concurs . i n : •-
opinion of CALI JSTEF , \. 
proco 
from one who had no ofiliation to pay it, 
but such assessment could not realistically 
ind justly be considered to ha^e been an 
assessment against the property OIL the CM 
porafkm nor 
obligation to 
(o | KEY HUMBCR SYSTEM^ 
discharge ihe corporation 
BUILDER 
PANY, 
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COMPONENTS SUPPLY U HI"! 
afntiff and Respondent, 
I. Taxation 
Only puurr an" 
property is <:>a* deb 
legislature. 
ssessor na-* to assess 
ed to him by the 
S. Clifford COCKAYNE, County Assessor, 
Defendant andNAppellant. 
\ 
\ 
ax a. i or. 36i 
t^ ere valid assessment '•:. : \ n made 
by an assessor cognizant of the tacX. un-
dervaluation^ ordinarily not a ground^ 
another assessment. 
3. Taxation '<§^ =>47{i)' 
IT open* should rft 
;42 
arbitrary assess 
naftie of ^rporation's . president, in 
Acfckm by corporation against w^u 
seeking the^eturn of taxes paid under pro-
test which weSe assessed against its person-
al property. Tbe\niirci District Court, Salt tion t<\nersonal property not owned b> 
Lake County, Josephs G. Jeppson, J., gave which w\s neither seen nor actual];- <; 
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REPORTS Oi< ( ASICS 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUK f 
OF THE 
STATE 
FNHttUARY TERM, 1903. 
W TJiK WATTKi; n l ' RICHARD F L I N T , Petitioner. 
No. 1148 (71 Pat f)31 ) 
Criminal Law; JtinHcJiH KUJ Indefinitely Suspending: Sen-
tence. 
*1 lie court, by indefinitely suspending sentence, and peimilting de-
fendant to go on his own recognizance, loses jurisdiction of him, 
so that it can not afterwards have him rearrested, and sent once 
him; no authority therefor being ghen by Revised Statute** 
1898. section 4905, providing that aftei a verdict of guilty, the 
court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment at least 
two days after the verdict, if the court is to remain in session 
so long, and section 4915, providing that the court shall then pro-
nounce judgment, in the absence of cause for not doing so l 
(I)eoidod February 13, 190,1 ) 
Original petition for a writ of lianas corpus Tlv writ 
was duly issued, served and return made. The factb are 
stated by the court. 
PETITIONER DISCHARGED. 
John E. Bagley, Esq., for petitioner, 
1
 People v Blackburn, 6 Utah 347; 23 Pac. 759. 
(338) 
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In the Matter of Flint. 
Hon, M. A. Breeden, Attorney-General, and Hon. W. 
R. White, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On the 25th day of February, 1902, the defendant in this 
case was duly convicted in the second judicial district court of 
this State of the crime of forgery. The court made an order 
directing the defendant to appear March 5, 1902, for sentence. 
The case was again: continued, and March 12, 1902, was fixed 
as the time for pronouncing judgment The defendant ap-
peared for sentence on the last mentioned date, and the court 
on its own motion, made and entered the following order: 
"The defendant having been convicted of the crime of forg-
ery, and being now before the court to receive sentence, and 
the court being sufficiently advised, it is ordered that sen-
tence be, and the same is hereby, suspended, and the defendant 
permitted to go up>n his own recognizance." The defendant, 
by this order, was, in effect, discharged from custody. On 
the 5th day of December, 1902, the judge before whom the 
defendant was tried and convicted made and entered the fol-
lowing order in the case: "On motion of A. B. Hayes, Esq., 
district attorney, it is ordered that said defendant appear 
before the court for sentence on Monday, January 5, 1903." 
On January 5, 1903, the time for fixing sentence was con-
tinued until January 12, 1903, on which date the defendant 
appeared in courts and duly objected to any further proceed-
ings in the premises on the ground that the court had no juris-
diction of the person of the defendant. The court overruled 
the objection, and sentenced the defendant to the state prison 
for a term of one year, and made an order duly committing 
him to the proper officers, with directions that the judgment 
be enforced. The defendant filed his petition in this court 
for a writ of habeas corpus, setting forth the foregoing facts. 
The writ was duly issued, served, and return made to this 
court 
o40 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH, 
In the Matter of Flint. 
McCARTY, J., after stating the facts, delivered the 
opinion of the court. 
Section 4905, Revised Statutes 1898, so far as material 
to ill is case, reads as follows: "After a verdict 
of guilt\ . if the judgment is not arrested or a new 
trial granted, the court must appoint a time for pronouncing 
judgment, which must be at least two days after the verdict, 
if the court intends to remain in session so long; or if not, 
as remote a time as can reasonably be allowed/' Section 
4913 provides: uYYhen the defendant shall appear for judg-
ment, he mubt be ininnnod b\ the court, o r by the clerk under 
its direction, of the natuie of the charge against him, and of 
hi- plea, and the verdict, if any thereon, and must be asked 
whether he has any legal cause to show win judgment should 
not be pronounced against him 11 Section 4915 is as follows: 
"If no -ufhoienf cause is alleged or appears to the court why 
judgment should not be pronounced, it must thereupon l>e 
reiidoi(d ,? The record shows that the proceedings in the 
O<M* up to the time fixed for passing sentence were regular, 
and lb- tntoi.»oin<» piu\ i-mii-of the statute complied with. 
ThoiOoio tho only question tor this court to determine is, 
did tiie court. In indefinitely suspending the sentence, lose 
jurisdiction of the* pciM>n of the defendant, or did it still re-
tain jurisdiction, with legal power and authority to sentence 
him to the State prison eleven months after he had ijeen 
discharged from custody? Under the foregoing provisions 
of the statute, a tidal court undoubtedly has the authority to 
postpone sentence from time to time for a proper purpose, 
Mich K to lutonn' iNoIi of tlu* circumstances surrounding tho 
conuni *ion of the crime for which the defendant stands con-
victed, on! thereby determine what penalty, under the facts 
of th< particular case, ought to be imposed, and also to en-
able the defendant to make the necessary preparations to 
move for an arrest of judgment or for a new trial. In fact, 
there arc many exigencies that could arise ^hieb might, in the 
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interests of justice, require a postponement of the time for 
sentence beyond that first fixed by the court In such cases 
the court may, in order to protect the interests of the State, 
and give the defendant ample time and opportunity to avail 
himself of every safeguard guaranteed him by law, suspend 
sentence from one designated time to another. But we know 
of no rule or principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely 
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of suspense 
and uncertainty, and, long after he has been discharged from 
custody, have him rearrested, and impose a sentence of either 
fine or imprisonment on him. A suspension of sentence for 
an indefinite period is, in effect, an exercise of the functions 
of the pardoning power, which belongs exclusively to the 
board of pardons—a separate and distinct department of the 
State government, and in no way connected with the trial 
courts. See section 12, a r t 7, Const.; People v. Blackburn, 
6 Utah 347, 348, 23 Pac. 759. When the court suspended 
judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant discharged 
from custody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him, and all 
subsequent proceedings in thf premises were unauthorized by 
law, and are therefore void. In re Strickler (Kan.), 33 Pac. 
620; People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372, 25 N. W. 318; U. S. 
v. Wilson (C. C ) , 46 Fed. 748; People v. Allen (111.), 39 
1ST. E. 568, 41 L. E. A. 473 ; Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 
296; People v. Morrisette, 20 How. Prac. 118. The case 
of People v. Blackburn, supra, cited and relied upon by the 
Attorney-General in support of his contention that the pro-
ceedings of the trial court were regular and should be upheld, 
supports the foregoing conclusions. In that case the court 
says: "After conviction the trial court may, undoubtedly, 
suspend judgment temporarily, for stated periods, from time 
to time. I t may be proper to do so to allow the defendant time 
to move for a new trial, to perfect an appeal, to present a pe-
tition for pardon, and to allow the court time to consider and 
determine the sentence to be imposed. But when a defendant 
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STATE v LEE LIM, 
No. 5041. Decided Februaty 4, 1932. <7 P. [2d] 825.) 
1. HABEAS CORPUS, Release on habeas corpus of prisoner unlawfully 
sentenced instead of remanding* held without effect on trial court's 
jurisdiction of further proceedings (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 8026f 
9041).] 
The judgment was without effect on further proceeding* 
because Supreme Court held that judgment of conviction on 
plea of guilty was valid and should be enforced by proper 
sentence, unless court had lost jurisdiction. District court 
was directed to make order releasing prisoner but without 
prejudice to right of state to reassume jurisdiction on further 
proceedings. 
2. CRIMINAL LAW. Trial court held to have jurisdiction to pronounce 
proper sentence on antecedent plea of guilty despite release of 
prisoner on habeas corpus after serving some three years of void 
sentence (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 8026, 9041, 9051, 9365).2 
Trial court had jurisdiction because only the sentence was 
void, not the judgment of conviction. If an appeal had been 
taken, the case would have been remanded as of course for 
proper sentence. A void judgment is a nullity, and cannot 
divest court of jurisdiction. Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 9041, 9051, 
provide that sentence must be imposed at least two days and 
not more than ten days after verdict or plea of guilty, in 
absence of arrest or new trial, if no sufficient cause appears 
why it should not be, but they do not cover a case like this, 
and are not jurisdictional. Comp. Laws 1917, 9365, which 
provides that irregularities and errors shall not affect plead-
ings or proceedings, unless they result in miscarriage of 
justice, is sufficiently broad to cover this case. 
'A CRIMINAL LAW Trial court held not to have abused discretion in 
refusing prisoner leave to withdraw plea of guilty on release on 
'Lee Lim v. Daim, lb Utah 245, 284 P. 323 
2State v. Carmen, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670; State V. Hales, 2? Utah 
65, 61 P. 905, 83 Am. St. Rep. 768; State V. Thompson, 15 Utah 488f 
50 P. 409; Rose v. Dist. Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P. 486, In re Flint, 
25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. St. Rep. 853; People v. Blackburn, 
6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759, 760; Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 889, 62 P 892; 
Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139 P 941. 
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habeas corpus after serving three years under void sentence 
(Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 8026, 8900). 
There was no abuse of discretion because there was no 
showing that the plea was entered in ignorance of rights or 
that it was the result of any undue influence. 
STRAUP and ELIAS HANSEN, JJ. , dissenting. 
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
County; D. W. Moffat, Judge. 
Lee Lim was convicted of murder in the second degree, 
and he appeals. 
AFFIRMED. 
King & King, of Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Geo. P. Parker, Atty. Gen., for the State. 
FOLLAND, J. 
The defendant, on October 13, 1926, in the district court 
of Salt Lake county, entered a plea of guilty to the charge 
of murder in the second degree, and was sentenced by the 
court to an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah 
State Prison of between ten years and life. Pursuant to 
this sentence, defendant was delivered to the warden of 
the state prison and remained imprisoned until released on 
habeas corpus proceedings in January, 1930. Lee Lim v. 
Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323, 325. In that case this court 
held the indeterminate sentence void for indefiniteness be-
cause not authorized by statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 
8026, providing for a definite term of imprisonment of not 
less than ten years and which may be for life, and therefore 
furnished no authority for defendant's incarceration in the 
state prison. He was thereupon released from custody, but 
was immediately thereafter apprehended on warrant of 
arrest issued out of the district court of Salt Lake county 
and brought before that court for sentence on February 15, 
1930. The defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the 
district court, and, without waiving such objection, under-
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The case being here on appeal, the district court was di-
rected to make an order releasing the prisoner, but "without 
prejudice to the rights of the state to take any lawful meas-
ure to reassume jurisdiction of the petitioner in order that 
further proceedings may be had against him according to 
law." 
It is now argued by appellant that, because of the use of 
this language, and particularly the word "reassume," the 
decision "could only mean one thing, that is, that the district 
court had lost jurisdiction because if that court has not 
lost jurisdiction it would not be necessary for it to Re-
assume* jurisdiction." To properly comprehend the meaning 
of that decision, it is necessary to read more than one sen-
tence or paragraph. From the context, it is clear that no 
such implication can arise from the language used. The 
general rule stated in 29 C. J. 175, was quoted with approval 
in Lee Lim v. Davis, supra, as follows: 
"Where the conviction is valid, but the judgment and sentence is 
unauthorized, the prisoner will be remanded to the custody of the 
proper officer in order that further proceedings may be had accord-
ing to law, or the discharge may be delayed for a reasonable time to 
permit of further proceedings." 
That we did not follow this rule and remand the prisoner 
to the trial court for sentence can have no effect on the 
validity of the sentence thereafter imposed.* This 
court did not decide that the trial court was without 1 
jurisdiction, but carefully refrained from passing on 
that question. If the trial court had jurisdiction, we did not 
deprive it of its power by failure to remand the prisoner 
for its action. 
We are of the view that the district court had jurisdiction 
of the case and of the defendant, notwithstanding the lapse 
of approximately three years and four months, and that the 
sentence pronounced by it on February 15, 1930, was 
in all respects lawful and valid. The first sentence 2 
being void, the jurisdiction of the district court con-
tinued over the case and the prisoner until a valid sentence 
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was imposed. The trial court in pronouncing its corrected 
sentence took into consideration the time already served by 
defendant, and fixed the commencement of such term as 
October 13, 1926, the day the void sentence was pronounced. 
Whether it was proper for the court to do this need not now 
be considered, since the defendant is not complaining of this 
part of the sentence, and, indeed, it is as favorable to him 
as he could hope for. Neither has the state complained of 
this feature of the sentence. 
The defendant himself was the actor in setting in motion 
the proceedings by which his sentence was declared void. 
Had the attack upon the sentence been direct by appeal in-
stead of collateral by writ of habeas corpus there could be 
no question of the jurisdiction of the district court to impose 
a proper sentence after the first was declared illegal or 
void. State v. Carmen, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670; Murphy 
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 
505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266; Id., 177 U. S. 
155, 20 S. Ct. 639, 44 L. Ed. 711, affirming Com. V. Murphy, 
174 Mass. 369, 54 N. E. 860, 48 L. R. A. 393, 75 Am. St. 
Rep. 353; 44 A. L. R. 1212. 
The defect in the first sentence did not inhere in the judg-
ment of conviction. The defendant pleaded guilty, and made 
no attack on any of the proceedings except the sentence. 
Had he appealed from the illegal sentence, as he had a right 
to do, notwithstanding his plea of guilty, this court would 
have set aside the sentence as void and have remanded the 
case to the trial court for a valid sentence. State v. Carmen, 
supra. There is no principle on which it can be successfully 
maintained that, by serving part of a void sentence instead 
of appealing from it, but later attacking it in collateral 
proceedings, the defendant can obtain immunity from be-
ing sentenced to the judgment provided by law. State v. 
Pitcher, 164 La. 1051, 115 So. 187. 
The contention that the sentence of October 26, 1925, is 
void for the purpose of holding the defendant in the custody 
of the warden of the state prison, but is valid as a discharge 
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ment of conviction. The defendant pleaded guilty, and made 
from the conviction under his plea of guilty, and is effective 
to the end the prosecution against him, is "illogical in the 
last degree." Ex parte Smith, 152 Cal. 566, 93 P. 191. A 
void judgment does not operate to divest a court of juris-
diction of the cause in which it is rendered. It is a mere 
nullity, and is ineffective for any purpose. 
"A judgment which is void, as distinguished from one which is mere-
ly voidable, or liable to be vacated or set aside for irregularity or 
other cause, or reversed for error, is a mere nullity; it is not binding 
on anyone; it raises no lien or estoppel; it does not impair or affect 
the rights of anyone, unless by the agreement of the parties concerned; 
it confers no rights upon the party in whose favor it is given, and 
affords no protection to persons acting under i t ; it does not even 
operate as a discontinuance of the action. Such a judgment may be 
vacated or set aside, even on motion of the party in whose favor it 
is given, if it is not such a judgment as he sought; but it is not neces-
sary to take any steps to vacate or avoid it until an effort is made 
to enforce it. A valid judgment may be entered subsequently in dis-
regard of the void judgment." 34 C. J . 609. 
Among the cases cited in support of this text is State v. 
Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905, 83 Am. St. Rep. 768. There 
the defendant was charged, convicted and sentenced for 
murder in the second degree. The offense was committed 
shortly before Utah became a state and the trial conducted 
after statehood before a jury of eight persons, as provided 
by the state Constitution. On appeal to the state Supreme 
Court, the judgment was affirmed. 14 Utah 293, 47 P. 78, 
43 L. R. A. 33. In the meantime, another case, State v. 
Thompson, 15 Utah 488, 50 P. 409, involving the legality 
of a trial before eight jurors for felony committed before 
statehood was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and it was by that court held that the provision for 
a jury of eight persons was ex post facto in its application 
to felonies committed before the territory became a state, 
and that the trial, conviction, and sentence were void. 170 
U. S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061. After this decision 
was announced, the defendant Bates, applied for and ob-
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tained his release from the state prison on a writ of habeas 
corpus. He was immediately rearrested and taken before 
the district court for trial, although more than two years 
had passed since his plea was entered. The district court 
held it had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the 
person of the defendant, and had no authority to try the 
case, and hence dismissed the case and released the defen-
dant. On appeal by the state, this court held that the void 
trial, conviction, and sentence were mere nullities, that the 
case remained pending in the district court as it was before 
the void trial and judgment, and "as a consequence, upon 
his release from imprisonment, because of a void judgment, 
he was again subject to arrest, under the same indictment 
and upon the same charge, and no plea of once having been 
put in jeopardy for the same offense can be a bar to a 
lawful trial, notwithstanding his former conviction stands 
unreversed." The cause was remanded, with directions to 
the court below to reinstate the case and proceed in accord-
ance with the decision. We see no substantial difference in 
principle between that case and this. Here the conviction 
was valid, but the sentence was void. The void sentence 
created no rights, nor did it impair or affect any right. 
The case stood as if no sentence had been imposed, and juris-
diction of the district court continued until a valid judg-
ment was imposed. This must be true, unless by mere lapse 
of time or because of the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 
1917, § 9041, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the 
case and person of the defendant. 
It shocks one's conception of good sense and justice to 
say that a person who has been lawfully convicted of a crime 
should be relieved from serving the sentence provided by 
law because the court erred in pronouncing sentence. Cer-
tainly the defendant ought not to be set at liberty until he 
has served the imprisonment which the law requires to be 
imposed upon him as punishment for his crime, Hcdderman's 
Case, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 554, unless he be relieved therefrom 
by lawful authority. 
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Our statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 9041, provides: 
"After a plea or verdict of guilty, * * * if the judgment 
is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court must appoint 
a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least 
two days and not more than ten days after verdict," and 
section 9051 provides: "If no sufficient cause is alleged or 
appears to the court why judgment should not be pro-
nounced, it must thereupon be rendered." The first judg-
ment was rendered within the time required by the statute, 
but that judgment, through mistake of the court in its con-
struction and application of the indeterminate sentence law, 
was in law void and of no effect for any purpose. Under 
these circumstances, can it be said that jurisdiction was lost 
because a valid judgment was not pronounced within the ten 
days of the plea of guilty? Undoubtedly the amendment of 
1915, which provided that sentence should be passed not more 
than ten days after verdict, was enacted pursuant to a sound 
public policy for the purpose of insuring prompt infliction of 
penalty upon one convicted of crime. It was not considered 
desirable that courts indulge in prolonged delays before 
sentencing convicted criminals. There is nothing in the 
statute, however, to indicate that the Legislature intended 
that the court should lose jurisdiction of the cause and that 
a convicted defendant should be entirely relieved of the 
punishment provided by law, if by accident, mistake, or 
design the court failed within ten days to impose a valid 
sentence, or was prevented from doing so because of the 
escape of the criminal after conviction and before sentence, 
or if the convicted person were at large on bail, and failed 
within that time to present himself for sentence. We think 
no one would so contend. This court has held the time fixed 
by the statute is not jurisdictional. Rose v. Dist. Court, 67 
Utah 526, 248 P. 486. If the statute in this particular be 
regarded as directory within the requirement that sentence, 
if not pronounced within ten days, should be imposed within 
a reasonable time, then, in determining what is a reasonable 
time, all the facts and circumstances should be considered. 
The minimum term of imprisonment which the court could 
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impose upon a defendant convicted of second degree murder 
is ten years. The maximum is life. A sentence for the mini-
mum term, if the defendant earned full credit for good 
behavior, would be served in five years and ten months. 
This defendant had served only three years and four months 
when released on habeas corpus. The defendant has not 
served even the minimum imprisonment required by law for 
his offense. Another circumstance to be considered is that 
the court intended to impose the sentence required by law, 
but through mistake failed in effecting that purpose, which 
is quite different to a case where the court for good cause 
shown determined that the prisoner should receive no pun-
ishment, notwithstanding the requirement of the law that 
sentence be imposed. In view of these circumstances, we 
cannot say that the time which elapsed between conviction 
and sentence was unreasonably long. 
We think, however, this statutory provision was not in-
tended to cover a situation such as appears in this case 
where sentence was imposed within the time required by sec-
tion 9041 but through mistake of law the sentence was void. 
The California courts have so held. There is sufficient 
similarity between the law of that state and of this state 
to justify us in following the same rule. Section 1191 of 
the Penal Code of California requires that the court appoint 
a time for pronouncing judgment, "which must not be less 
than two, nor more than five days after the verdict or plea 
of guilty." That statute is different from ours, in that it 
further provides that the court may extend the time not 
more than ten days for the purpose of hearing or determin-
ing a motion for new trial or one in arrest of judgment, 
or for not more than twenty days to consider the question 
of probation, and upon request of the defendant for not 
more than ninety days additional. Section 1202 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code provides that sentence must be pro-
nounced at the time so fixed, and, to prevent courts from 
arbitrarily ignoring and disobeying the law, it is then fur-
ther provided that, if the sentence be not pronounced within 
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the time limited, "the defendant shall be entitled to a new 
trial." These sections of the California Code have been held 
to have no application, and are not effective to defeat the 
jurisdiction of the trial court to pronounce a valid sentence, 
notwithstanding lapse of time beyond that provided by stat-
ute, in cases where the facts were similar to those of the 
instant case, that is, where a sentence was pronounced with-
in the time but found to be void because of the mistaken 
application of the indeterminate sentence law, and notwith-
standing there were no motions or proceedings of any kind 
to stay arrest or prevent the rendition of such judgment. 
In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958. 
It is apparent that section 9041 of our Code has no appli-
cation to a case where the trial court in good faith attempted 
to follow the law, but through mistake entered a void judg-
ment instead of a valid one. Our Legislature, however, has 
made provision with respect to errors and mistakes in the 
administration of the criminal law in the following language : 
"Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this code 
in respect to any pleading or proceeding nor any error or mistake 
therein shall render it invalid unless it shall have actually resulted in 
a miscarriage of justice." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 9365. 
This section is sufficiently broad to cover a departure 
through error from the exact time of pronouncing sentence. 
The defendant suffers no injustice because he has not been 
made to suffer even the minimum punishment which the 
law prescribes for his crime, while a strict application of 
section 9041 to the circumstance of this case would result in 
entirely relieving the defendant from punishment for his 
crime and be a gross miscarriage of justice. 
In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, we 
must say, as was said in Beale v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 11, 
quoted with approval and applied to facts substantially the 
same as here, by Mr. Justice Field in re Bonner, 151 U. S. 
242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 327, 38 L. Ed. 149: 
"The common law embodies in itself sufficient reason and common 
sense to reject the monstrous doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is 
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established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether 
because the court committed error in passing: the sentence." 
An error of the court in imposing sentence is regarded 
a correctible matter in Ex parte Lewis, 51 Mont. 539, 154 P. 
713, wherein the court said: 
"One of the chief purposes of all legal administration is the pre-
vention of crime, by the due punishment of persons judicially ascer-
tained to have been guilty of crime; and no person whose guilt has 
been judicially determined is entitled to immunity merely because the 
trial court having jurisdiction of him and his cause has made a mis-
take in a correctible matter. We say 'correctible matter* advisedly, 
because the imposition of sentence is such a matter. 8 R C. L § 239; 
note to 3 Ann. Cas. p. 1024 et seq." 
All the decisions which we have found or which have been 
called to our attention based upon facts identical with or 
similar to the facts present in this case support the conclu-
sion we have reached herein. These cases fall into two gen-
eral classes: First, those where the question was considered 
on habeas corpus, and the court either assumed or decided 
that the trial court had not lost jurisdiction to resentence 
the defendant, and thereupon directed him held for the 
further action of the trial court, or the defendant was re-
leased without prejudice to further action by the trial court; 
and, second, cases decided on appeal from a judgment of 
resentence after the defendant had theretofore been released 
from custody under the void sentence. All such cases are 
directly in point, and support the view that the trial court, 
notwithstanding lapse of time, had jurisdiction to pronounce 
a valid sentence as provided by law. A leading case is the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court, In re Bonner, 
151 U. S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 326, 38 L. Ed. 149. There the 
defendant attacked by writ of habeas corpus a sentence of 
the United States District Court imposing imprisonment 
for a year in the state penitentiary. The sentence was de-
clared void and the defendant released, but without preju-
dice to the United States to take lawful measures to have 
the petitioner sentenced in accordance with law upon the 
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verdict against him. Seven months had passed, during which 
he was incarcerated under the void sentence. The court, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Field, said: 
"Much complaint is made that persons are often discharged from 
arrest and imprisonment when their conviction, upon which such 
imprisonment was ordered, is perfectly correct; the excess of juris-
diction on the part of the court being in enlarging the punishment, 
or in enforcing it in a different mode or place than that provided by 
the law. But in such cases there need not be any failure of justice, 
for, where the conviction is correct, and the error or excess of juris-
dition has been as stated, there does not seem to be any good reason 
why jurisdiction of the prisoner should not be reassumed by the court 
that imposed the sentence, in order that its defect may be corrected. 
# * * 
"Some of the state courts have expressed themselves strongly in 
favor of the adoption of this course, where the defects complained 
of consist only in the judgment,—in its extent or mode, or place of 
punishment,—the conviction being in all respects regular. In Beale 
v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 11, 22, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
said: 'The common law embodies in itself sufficient reason and 
common sense to reject the monstrous doctrine tha t a prisoner, whose 
guilt is established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment 
altogether because the court committed an error in passing the sen-
tence. If this court sanctioned such a rule, it would fail to perform 
the chief duty for which it was established.' 
"I t is true that this language was used in a case pending in the 
supreme court of a state on writ of error, but if then the court would 
send the case back to have the error, not touching the verdict, cor-
rected, and justice enforced, there is the same reason why such cor-
rection should be made when the prisoner is discharged on habeas 
corpus for alleged defects of jurisdiction in the rendition of the 
judgment under which he is held. The end sought by him—to be 
relieved from the defects in the judgment rendered to his injury—is 
secured, and at the same time the community is not made to suffer 
by a failure in the enforcement of justice against him." 
This rule was followed in Bryant v. U. S., 214 F. 51, 53, a 
decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 
wherein, on appeal, the court affirmed a corrected sentence 
by the district court after the prisoner had been released 
on habeas corpus from imprisonment under a void sentence. 
The appellant urged lack of jurisdiction in the court to im-
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pose a corrected sentence on grounds of double jeopardy and 
lapse of time. The court said i 
"The objection of double jeopardy ior the same offense is made* 
It is well settled that it is not double jeopardy to resentence a prisoner 
who had his first sentence vacated by writ of error (Murphy v. Masses 
chusetts, 111 U. S. 155, 20 S. Ct. 639, 44 L. Ed. 711), nor to retry 
him on a new indictment after a prior indictment, conviction, and 
sentence have been set aside in a proceeding in error (Ball v. United 
States, 163 I I S. 662, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 L. Ed. 300). The principle 
of such cases is that a sentence that has been vacated by the action 
of a prisoner cannot then be put up by him as an obstacle to the 
futher administration of justice; and we think it immaterial that his 
attack was collateral, as by habeas corpus, instead of direct, by appeal 
or writ of error. Here he was the actor, and the result left his con-
viction unimpaired. * * * 
"Had his attack on the sentence been direct, clearly jurisdiction 
would have been retained after the expiration of the trial term, and 
in sound reason the case should not be different where the attack is 
collateral. Otherwise it is plain that a gross miscarriage of justice 
could be accomplished by mere delay of habeas corpus until adjourn-
ment of the term at which sentence was imposed. If the first sen-
tence be regarded as having been wholly vacated at the instance of 
Bryant, the case would then stand upon trial and conviction without 
sentence, in which view jurisdiction of the unfinished business would 
remain." 
The rule was again followed in Hammers v. 17. £>., 271) F. 
265, 266, a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth 
Circuit, on appeal from a corrected sentence after the de-
fendant had been released on habeas corpus from imprison-
ment under a void sentence and resentence a year and five 
months after plea of guilty. The court said: 
The imposition of a void sentence is not an obstacle to the assump-
tion by the court which imposed it of jurisdiction of the convict, in 
order that a legal sentence may be imposed. Where there is a convic-
tion, accompanied by a void sentence, the court's jurisdiction of the 
case for the purpose of imposing a lawful sentence is not lost by the 
expiration of the term a t which the void sentence was imposed. The 
case is to be regarded as pending until it is finally disposed of by tin 
imposition of a lawful sentence. 
"If the invalidity of the sentences had been directly attacked, clearly 
jurisdiction would have been retained after the expiration of Uiv 
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trial term. In sound reason the case should not be different where 
the attack is collateral. One duly convicted, but not sentenced as 
authorized by law, cannot defeat the court's incompletely exercised 
jurisdiction over him by attacking: a void sentence in habeas corpus 
proceedings instituted after the adjournment of the term at which 
such void action was taken. Bryant v. United States, 214 F. 51, 130 
C. C. A. 491. 
"This is not a case of a court losing: jurisdiction to resentence as 
a result of a previous imposition of a valid punishment, to which, in 
whole or in part, the convict was subjected. Hammers was not pun-
ished twice for the same offense." 
In each of the following cases, on attack by habeas corpus, 
the appellate court, after declaring the sentence void, re-
manded the applicant to the trial court for imposition of 
a lawful sentence,, after valid conviction upon verdict of the 
jury or plea of guilty, upon the theory that such court had 
jurisdiction to impose a valid sentence notwithstanding lapse 
of time. We have indicated the time between sentence and 
release where such information is obtainable from the de-
cision. State ex rel Petcoff v. Reed, 138 Minn. 465, 163 
N. W. 984 (3 years 8 months) ; State v. Pitcher, 164 La. 
1051, 115 So. 187 (7 months) ; Haider man's Case, 53 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 554 (2 or 3 years) ; Com, v. Ashe, 293 Pa. 18, 
141 A. 723 (1 year 3 months) ; In re Harris, 68 Vt. 243, 35 A. 
55 (nearly 3 months) ; Ex parte Lewis, 51 Mont. 539, 154 P. 
713; Ex parte Howard, 72 Kan. 273, 83 P. 1032; Johnson v. 
State, 81 Fla. 783, 89 So. 114; Hampton v. Orme, 92 Fla. 
412, 109 So. 455; Ex parte Simmons, 73 Fla. 998, 75 So. 
542 (10 years 7 months) ; In re Williamson, 116 Wash. 560, 
200 P. 329; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283, $8 
L. Ed. 549. 
The California Supreme Court has uniformly upheld the 
jurisdiction of the trial court to reassume jurisdiction of a 
defendant released on habeas corpus because of a void sen-
tence, and thereafter to pronounce a valid sentence, and also 
to itself set aside such void sentence and by its own process 
bring the defendant before it for imposition of a valid sen-
tence notwithstanding the lapse of time. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 
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690, 171 V 958, a decision of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, the petitioner, on habeas corpus, was released from 
imprisonment under a void sentence, but there had been a 
valid conviction, and the prisoner was remanded for sen-
tence by the trial court. He had been sentenced to an in-
determinate term, but, because the crime had been committed 
before the passage of the Indeterminate Sentence Act, it 
was held he should have been sentenced to a definite term. 
Section 1191 of the Penal Code of California as heretofore 
stated, provided for pronouncement of sentence within a 
limited time after verdict. The court held, however, that 
this section had no application to this kind of a case where 
sentence, although void, had been imposed. There five 
months had elapsed between sentence and release on habeas 
corpus. People V. Booth, 37 Cal. App. 650, 174 P. 685, is a 
decision by the District Court of Appeals, Third District. 
The defendant had been sentenced to an indeterminate term, 
but, after the decision of In re Lee, supra, he wrote the trial 
judge calling his attention to that decision. The trial court, 
although defendant had served six months of the sentence, 
brought the defendant before it, vacated the indeterminate 
sentence as void, and pronounced a definite sentence. From 
this judgment the defendant appealed. The court affirmed 
the sentence holding that the trial court had not lost juris-
diction to pronounce a valid judgment. Thereafter the same 
defendant sought to be released from the corrected judg-
ment by applying for a writ of habeas corpus, but the writ 
was denied in re Booth, 44 Cal. App. 660, 186 P. 841. 
People v. Scott, 39 Cal. App. 128, 178 P. 298, is an appeal 
from a corrected sentence. The defendant was first sen-
tenced to an indeterminate term and commenced serving 
his sentence. Eight months later he was brought before 
the court and resentenced to a definite term; the first sen-
tence being void. He objected to the court's jurisdiction, 
and on appeal urged that the time fixed by the statute for 
the passing of sentence had lapsed, and that he was entitled 
to a new trial; also that the court had lost jurisdiction be-
cause he had partly served the void sentence. Th^ court 
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held against him on both propositions. In re Fritz, 179 Cal. 
415, 177 P. 157, the Supreme Court, on habeas corpus, de-
clined to hold void a corrected sentence for a definite term 
imposed ten months after conviction, where the trial court, 
the indeterminate sentence being void, brought the defen-
dant before it and imposed a sentence for a definite term. 
In re McCready, 179 Cal. 514, 177 P. 459, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the procedure approved in re Lee, supra. 
In People v. Gibson, 45 Cal. App. 770, 188 P. 603, the de-
defendant was convicted of rape. On appeal, the conviction 
was affirmed. Thereafter on habeas corpus proceedings 
the sentence was declared void because indeterminate when 
it should have been definite. This question had not been 
raised on his appeal. He was remanded to the trial court, 
where a definite sentence was imposed. He then appealed 
from the corrected sentence, and urged that the sentence was 
void, for the reason that defendant had been put twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense, and because sentence had 
not been passed within a reasonable time after conviction. 
The exact time which had elapsed between conviction and 
imposition of corrected sentence is not shown, but it is ap-
parent that two or three years must have passed. The 
court held against appellant on all his contentions. Petition 
for review of the judgment of the District Court of Appeals 
was denied by the Supreme Court. 45 Cal. App. 770, 188 
P. 603. See, also, In re Germino, 38 Cal. App. 497, 176 
P. 701; In re Nichols, 82 Cal. App. 73, 255 P. 244; Ex parte 
Colford, 68 Cal. App. 308, 229 P. 63; Ex parte Smith, 152 
Cal. 566, 93 P. 191. 
The defendant has cited and relies upon the following 
cases: People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759, 760; In 
re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, 532, 95 Am. St. Rep. 853; 
Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 389, 62 P. 892; Reese V. Olsen, 
44 Utah 318, 139 P. 941; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall (85 
U. S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872; Com. v. Morgan, 278 Pa. 395, 
123 A. 337; Mintie v. Biddle (C. C. A.) 15 F. (2d) 931; 
U. S. v. Wilson (C. C.) 46 F. 748; People v. Drysch, 311 
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111. 342, 143 N. E. 100; Gillespie v. Walker ((1 C. A.) 29© 
F. 330; People v. Leinecke, 290 111. 560, 125 N. E. 513; 
Smith v. State, 188 Ind. 64, 121 N. E. 829, 3 A. L. R. 999; 
Ex parte Cox, 3 Idaho 530, 32 P. 197, 95 Am. St. Rep. 29; 
Ex parte Garrity, 97 Cal. App. 372, 275 P. 480; Smith v. 
Dist. Court, 132 Iowa 603, 109 N. W. 1085, 11 Ann. Cas. 
296. These cases involve either indefinite suspension of 
execution of sentence, or the indefinite postponement of 
sentence, or a sentence partly valid and partly void, and 
are not in point, since the questions therein decided are 
entirely different from the question now before us They 
rest on entirely different facts, and are supported by rea-
sons that are not applicable here. A reference to the Utah 
cases cited will be sufficient to show that these cases cannot 
avail to support the appellant's contentions. In People v. 
Blackburn, supra, a defendant was convicted of the crime 
of involuntary manslaughter, a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term of not to exceed five years. On the 
day fixed for sentence, the defendant moved the court that 
sentence be indefinitely suspended during good behavior. 
The court made an order, reciting that good and sufficient 
reasons were made to appear therefor, granting the motion 
and indefinitely suspending sentence during good behavior. 
A few days later the judge who tried the case and made 
such order resigned. After his successor took office, the 
district attorney moved for an order appointing a time for 
passing sentence. This motion was denied. The district 
attorney then sought from the Supreme Court a writ of 
mandate directed to the defendant district judge requiring 
him to proceed to judgment and sentence. This court, while 
implying that the trial court would ordinarily be required 
to impose sentence, denied the writ for other reasons stated 
as follows: 
"While we have no doubt, as before stated, that it is the duty of 
the court in which a conviction is had to proceed to judgment within 
the limits prescribed by law for the exercise of its discretion, and 
that it cannot rightfully exercise the pardoning power by refusing 
judgment, but that, where the statute prescribing the punishment for 
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a crime only fixes a maximum punishment, thereby expressly author-
izing- the court, in its discretion, to fix any degree of punishment from 
such maximum down to a purely nominal punishment, and it is 
apparent from the record that the court, in the exercise of such dis-
cretion, has determined that the lowest possible punishment should be 
inflicted, the failure of the court to pass judgment is more a matter 
of form than of substance. The mandate of this court would only 
require the performance of a technical duty. For this reason we do 
not think we are called upon to interfere by issuing the writ asked 
for. The writ should be denied." 
In re Flint, supra, this court held that the trial court 
had no authority to indefinitely suspend the imposition of 
sentence, since it was in effect an exercise of the pardoning 
power, and that "when the court suspended judgment in-
definitely, and ordered the defendant discharged from cus-
tody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him, and all subse-
quent proceedings in the premises were unauthorized by 
law, and are therefore void." It is strongly urged that the 
Flint Case is in point, and therefore decisive of the question 
we are now considering, but the case rests upon a state of 
facts so different from the facts of the case at bar that it 
ought not to be controlling on us in reaching a correct 
solution of the question before us. The effect of that decision 
should be restricted to those facts, and not extended to 
another situation resting upon entirely different facts. The 
result of the decision in the Flint Case was to give effect 
to the order of suspension and the discharge of the defen-
dant. This result usually does not follow the entry of a 
void judgment. The court did not say that the order was 
void, but held that the trial court divested itself of jurisdic-
tion over the defendant and the case by the order of suspen-
sion and discharge of the defendant. This being true, it 
would undoubtedly follow, as was there held, that the trial 
court was without power to make another or different order 
or to thereafter pronounce judgment. There the trial court 
reached the conclusion that the defendant should not be made 
to suffer for his crime the punishment provided by statute, 
at least not presently or during good behavior, and there-
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upon suspended the imposition of sentence and discharged 
the defendant. Here the trial court concluded the defendant 
should suffer the punishment imposed by the statute, and 
attempted to pass sentence in compliance with the statutory 
mandate, but, because of an erroneous interpretation of the 
law, it imposed a void sentence. Nothing here was inten-
tionally done by the court looking to the discharge of the 
convicted defendant. The reasons underlying the decision in 
the Flint Case, the cases cited therein for support, and the 
cases thereafter decided following the same rule, are perti-
nent to the facts of such cases, wherein sentence was in-
definitely suspended and the defendant discharged, and ex-
plain and support the holding that the court in such cases 
lost jurisdiction to impose a valid sentence. These reasons 
are wholly foreign and inapplicable to the facts of a case 
such as this, wherein sentence was imposed, but, because of 
mistake, the sentence was void. The reasons given in those 
cases and by text-writers sufficiently indicate that they are 
inapplicable to this case. In 8 R. C. L. 251, the rule is stated 
as follows: 
"In those jurisdictions wherein the rule prevails that a trial court 
has no power to grant an indefinite suspension of sentence, the court, 
by granting such suspension, loses its jurisdiction and cannot pro-
nounce sentence a t a subsequent time. In such case, having completed 
its judicial functions, it has voluntarily surrendered all further con-
trol over the case and person, and if the defendant is re-arrested is 
entitled to be discharged." 
In Weaver V. People, 33 Mich. 296, I Am. (Jr. Rep. 552, a 
case cited and relied upon in the Flint Case, it was held 
that sentence could not be imposed after an indefinite sus-
pension of the imposition of sentence, for the reasons that 
such action signified that the court intended to let the 
offender go without punishment and was a practical aban-
donment of the prosecution. The court said: 
"To sentence the prisoner to the penitentiary under such circum-
stances, and when the trial judge has distinctly said he ought not to 
be so sentenced, is not supplying his omissions, but is overruling his 
decision. This we think not admissible, and the sentence was un-
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authorized, and the judgment must be reversed, and the prisoner 
discharged." 
In U. S. v. Wilson (C. C.) 46 F. 748, also cited and relied 
on in the Flint Case, it was held in effect that the order 
for suspension of sentence and discharge, having been once 
made, could not at a later term be revoked. In Collins V. 
State, 24 Okl. Cr. 117, 217 P. 896, 899, such action by the 
trial court was held to be "a practical abandonment of the 
prosecution." People v. Allen, 155 111. 61, 39 N. E. 568, 41 
L. R. A. 473, cited and relied upon in the Flint Case, merely 
held that where the trial court fails to perform its duty but 
discharges the prisoner or permits him to go indefinitely 
it is practically an abandonment of the prosecution and its 
power and jurisdiction over him ceases and a subsequent 
sentence is without judicial authority. Other reasons are 
that the defendant ought not to be held "in fear of punish-
ment which may or may not be inflicted at the pleasure of 
those in authority." State ex rel Dawson V. Sapp, 87 Kan. 
740, 125 P. 78, 80, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 249. "To allow such 
power would place the criminal at the caprice of the judge," 
People v. Barrett, 202 111. 289, 67 N. E. 23, 63 L. R. A. 82, 
95 Am. St. Rep. 230, or at the caprice of the prosecuting 
officer. Grtindel v. People, 33 Colo. 191, 79 P. 1022, 108 
Am. St. Rep. 75. In view that the facts are different and 
the reasons underlying the decisions are entirely inappli-
cable, the decision in the Flint Case ought to be restricted 
to the facts of that case and not be extended so as to be a 
precedent for any other case resting upon entirely different 
facts. 
The other Utah cases cited by appellant are also inap-
plicable and furnish no support for his contention. Roberts 
v. Howells, supra, merely holds that a judgment which im-
poses imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine due the $tate, 
after the right to punish by imprisonment has been ex-
hausted by completion of a jail sentence on the same judg-
ment, is void so far as it attempts to imprison for nonpay-
ment of such fine. Reese v. Olsen, supra, held that the court 
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had no power to indefinitely suspend execution of sentence, 
and that the portion of a judgment suspending execution 
of the sentence was void and of no effect, but that the judg-
ment of imprisonment must be executed. If that case has 
any bearing upon the instant case, it would support our 
conclusions, because by it the court holds that a void por-
tion of judgment is ineffective for any purpose, and leaves 
the valid portion of the judgment as it was, subject to law-
ful proceedings to be taken as if the invalid part had never 
been rendered. The other cases cited by appellant fall into 
one or the other classifications heretofore discussed. These 
cases involve situations entirely different to the one here 
presented, and ought not to be followed or the implications 
arising therefrom extended to support a case like this where 
the facts are so entirely different 
The cited case of State v. Gray, 37 N. J. Law, ^68, is to 
the effect that, on habeas corpus, where the sentence is void, 
the defendant should be discharged, and that neither the 
appellate court nor the court below can pass a corrected 
sentence. On the latter point, the case seems not to have 
been followed, and is certainly against the great weight of 
authority. 
We hold, therefore, that the district court had jurisdiction 
to pronounce a valid judgment upon the defendant when 
the sentence complained of was imposed on February 15, 
1930. 
The second point urged by appellant is that the 
court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his 3 
plea of guilty before pronouncement of the corrected 
sentence on February 15, 1930. The motion was made b> 
counsel in this language: 
"Your honor, Section 8900 grants us powei to at any time withdraw 
our plea and at this time the defendant withdraws his plea of guilty, 
and asks that a plea of not guilty be entered. I do not care to argue i t " 
The motion was resisted by the state upon the ground 
that the statute was not mandatory and that the court had 
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discretion to refuse the demand. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
§ 8900, provides: 
"The court may at any time before judgment upon a plea of guilty 
permit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." 
Several other states have a similar statute. The over-
whelming weight of authority is that this provision confers 
a discretionary power upon the trial court to allow or dis-
allow the change of plea. State v. Walters, 48 S. D. 322, 204 
N. W. 171; People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 45 P. 986; State v. 
Powell, 153 Wash. 110, 279 P. 573; Cook v. State (Okl. Cr. 
App.) 281 P. 819; Penrod V. State (OkL Cr. App.) 281 P. 
160; People v. Dabner, 153 Cal. 398, 95 P. 880; People v. 
Cosgrove, 48 Cal. App. 710, 192 P. 165; Curran V. State, 
53 Or. 154, 99 P. 420. The general rule in the absence of 
statute is that it is discretionary with the court to permit, 
or to refuse to permit, a plea of guilty to be withdrawn for 
the purpose of interposing a plea of not guilty, and the 
court's discretion in the matter will not be reversed except 
for an abuse of discretion. 16 C. J. 397. 
It was not made to appear that the defendant had entered 
his plea of guilty in ignorance of his rights or that he was 
influenced unduly or improperly either by hope or fear, or 
that it was entered by reason of mistake or misapprehension 
or undue influence. The motion was not supported by any 
allegations of fact which called for an exercise of discretion 
favorable to the request. There was no abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in refusing to permit defendant to change 
his plea. 
The judgment and sentence of the district court of Salt 
Lake county is affirmed. 
CHERRY, C. J., and EPHRAIM HANSON, J., concur. 
STRAUP, J. 
I dissent. The defendant Lee Lim and S. E. Yang in the 
district court by information were charged with the crime 
of murder in the first degree. The case came on for trial 
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May 24,1926. On June 4 the case was submitted to the jury. 
After deliberating on their verdict for 36 hours, they re-
ported they were unable to agree, and were discharged. The 
case came on for retrial October 13. At that time the dis-
trict attorney by leave of court dismissed the case as to 
Yang, and amended the information as to Lee Lim, charg-
ing him with murder in the second degree. Lim pleaded 
guilty thereto, and waived time for sentence. Thereupon 
the judgment and sentence of the court was rendered that 
hv he "confined and imprisoned at hard labor in the state 
prison in and for the State of Utah for an indeterminate 
term as provided by section 9064, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
and the Sheriff of Salt Lake County is charged with the 
execution of this order." A commitment in language of the 
judgment was issued accordingly, and in pursuance thereof 
Lim on October 16, 1926, was by the sheriff delivered to the 
warden of the state prison in execution of the judgment. 
More than three years thereafter Lim, on habeas corpus 
proceedings, was by this court on December 29, 1929, re-
leased and discharged from imprisonment and from the 
custody of the warden upon the ground that the court was 
unauthorized to render a judgment of an indeterminate sen-
tence, and that the judgment thus was void. When granting 
the discharge from imprisonment and from custody of the 
warden, it was urged that we then remand the prisoner 
to the district court, with direction that a proper and valid 
judgment be there rendered and entered. Wo declined to 
do so, and refrained from deciding whether the district 
court then had or had not jurisdiction to further proceed in 
the cause, or to render a new or another judgment. Lee Lim 
v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323. After the prisoner was 
discharged and released, he on February 1, 1930, on a new 
warrant of arrest, was brought before the district court, 
and, over his objection, and upon the court's refusal to per-
mit him to withdraw his plea of guilty, the court, on Febru-
are 15, 1930, without any further proceedings had, ren-
dered a judgment that the prisoner be confined in the state 
prison for a term of ten years, the minimum period for 
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murder in the second degree, the term to relate back and 
begin October 13, 1926, at which time the prisoner on the 
first judgment was delivered to the warden. The court 
thereupon issued a certificate of probable cause for an 
appeal, stayed the execution of the judgment, and admitted 
the prisoner to bail pending the appeal in the sum of $500. 
The crucial question thus to be determined is as to 
whether the district court, three years and four months 
after the first judgment was pronounced, and after it partly 
had been executed, still had jurisdiction of the cause and 
without further proceedings had therein to render the sec-
ond judgment. In determining that, it is not the question 
of whether it is or is not deemed "shocking" if it be held the 
district court had not jurisdiction to render a further or 
another judgment, for jurisdiction of the court is not de-
pendent upon the extent to which the conscience of the 
court is or may be shocked. I t is dependent upon the power 
and authority conferred upon the court by law, by the Con-
stitution and the statute to render a judgment. If no such 
power or authority then existed, none may be assumed or 
granted on the theory that, if jurisdiction is not exercised, 
the accused in a particular case may go without sufficient 
punishment. In safeguarding the rights of the state, those 
of the accused must not be overlooked, and must also be 
protected. Jurisdiction to try and punish for crime cannot be 
acquired otherwise than in the mode prescribed by law, and, 
if it is not so acquired, any judgment rendered is a nullity. 
16 C. J. 176. That the court when the first judgment was 
rendered had jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the per-
son, and then had jurisdiction of the cause, is undoubted. 
The pertinent question is, Had the court still jurisdiction 
and custody of the cause and of the defendant when the 
second judgment was rendered? I think no one speaking 
within the law is bold enough to assert that, because a court 
once had jurisdiction of a cause, it for all time thereafter 
retained jurisdiction over it. There must be some time after 
the cause is finally disposed of when the court loses juris-
diction of the cause, except for motions for a new trial, 
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postponement of sentence, arrest of judgment, or for other 
proceedings in the cause as may by statute be provided. 
Hence the general rule is that a court having obtained 
jurisdiction retains it until the final disposition of the cause; 
but, after final judgment has been rendered and the parties 
dismissed and the term of court has ended, the jurisdiction 
of the court is exhausted, and it can take no further pro-
ceedings in the cause, except with respect to the enforce-
ment of the judgment, or, in a proper case, its correction or 
vacation. 15 C. J. 825. Again, it is well recognized that 
generally judgments are required to be rendered and entered 
in the term at which the verdict is rendered or the decision 
made, and cannot regularly be rendered after the term, 
unless rendition of the judgment is carried over to a suc-
ceeding term by proper record entries necessary to preserve 
jurisdiction of the case. 34 C. J. 65. 
Our statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 8547, provides that 
the procedure in criminal cases in the courts of this state 
shall be as prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure; 
by section 9041, if the judgment is not arrested or a new 
trial granted, the court must appoint a time for pronounc-
ing judgment which shall be not less than two days and not 
more than ten days after verdict, at which appointed time, 
section 9051, if no sufficient cause appears why judgment 
should not be pronounced, "it must thereupon be rendered." 
The statute in this particular is unlike the statute of Cali-
fornia, and hence the cited California cases are not appli-
cable. Under the statute, no one may successfully contend 
that the court at all events and under all circumstances is 
bound to appoint a time for pronouncing judgment not more 
than ten days after verdict. If a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment or other proceeding is pending in the 
cause, the court of course is not required to fix a time for 
pronouncing judgment until such motion or other proceed-
ing is disposed of. And thereafter and at the time fixed 
for pronouncing sentence, if sufficient cause is made to 
appear why judgment should not then be pronounced, the 
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sentence may be postponed until such matter is disposed of. 
I t is readily conceivable that in some instances a motion or 
other proceeding in the cause may carry the case over to 
a term subsequent to the term at which the verdict was 
rendered, in which case the court has not lost jurisdiction 
after such motion or proceeding has been disposed of to fix 
a time and pronounce judgment at a subsequent term. But 
in such case, after all motions and proceedings in the cause 
subsequent to verdict have been disposed of and denied, 
and nothing further made to appear why judgment should 
not be pronounced, the court is then required to fix a time 
and pronounce a judgment, if not within ten days after such 
proceedings have ended, at least within a reasonable time 
thereafter. Though it be assumed that the statute in such 
particular is directory, or where no judgment is rendered 
within the term (we here have a system of terms of courts) 
in which the verdict was rendered or decision made, and no 
proceedings had to stay or prevent the rendition of a judg-
ment, and that it may thereafter within a reasonable time 
be rendered at a subsequent term, yet it may not success-
fully be contended that more than three years thereafter 
is a reasonable time, when, as here, each year terms of court 
have come and gone, terms of judges ended, and judges in 
office when the first judgment was rendered succeeded by 
others when the second judgment was rendered. After the 
first judgment was rendered, there were no motions or 
proceedings of any kind to stay, arrest, or prevent the rendi-
tion of a judgment. That such judgment as so rendered was 
final and the case finally disposed of may not well be 
doubted. In obedience thereto, the defendant was delivered 
to the warden in execution of the judgment and a return 
of the commitment filed by the sheriff that the judgment 
had been executed by him as by the commitment commanded. 
Our Constitution and statute permit an appeal only from a 
final judgment. Had an appeal been taken from the first 
judgment, no one, I think, would have contended that the 
judgment was not final, or that the cause was still pending 
94 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH [February 
State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68 
in the district court undisposed of, and that thus no appeal 
from judgment would lie. Hence it is clear that, when the 
first judgment was rendered, the court rendered a final 
judgment and finally disposed of the case. In such respect 
the court fully exhausted its jurisdiction. 
But it is said the first judgment was void. So it was. 
We so held in the habeas corpus proceeding. Still that did 
not affect the finality of the judgment or as finally dispos-
ing of the case. Of course, the judgment being void upon 
its face, it was a nullity, and subject to attack directly or 
collaterally whenever and wherever brought in question and 
was subject to be expunged and vacated at any time within 
or after the term in which it was rendered, in some in-
stances on motion of the party or parties injured by it, or 
even on the court's own motion, or on suit brought for such 
purpose. 3 Bancroft Code Practice and Remedies, p. 2439; 
34 C. J. 17; 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) 443. All 
that is readily conceded. But the pertinent question is as 
to whether the court, regardless of time, whether 3, 10, 20, 
or more years after the void judgment was rendered, not 
only could expunge the judgment from the records of the 
court, but also still had jurisdiction and custody of the 
cause and of the parties to render a new or another judg-
ment in such cause. I will concede that by some courts on 
habeas corpus proceedings, where a defendant was impris-
oned under a void judgment and was discharged and re-
leased from imprisonment, he was remanded to the court 
in which the judgment was rendered, with directions to pro-
nounce and enter a valid judgment, in some instances, re-
gardless of the time intervening between the two judgments, 
but in most such cases it merely was assumed, without 
considering the question, that the court in which the first 
judgment was rendered still had custody and jurisdiction 
of the cause and of the parties to render a new and another 
judgment. The reason given by some of such courts, the cases 
in which such views are expressed being cited in the pre-
vailing opinion, is, that in a collateral proceeding, wherein 
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the prisoner or one illegally imprisoned or restrained on a 
void judgment is released, it in legal effect is the same as 
setting aside a judgment on direct appeal or writ of error 
in the cause in which the judgment was rendered. When 
considered and analyzed, I think the distinction of the two 
proceedings is manifest. In case of a direct appeal or writ 
of error, the cause itself from the court in which the void 
judgment was rendered is transferred to the appellate or 
reviewing court, thereby giving that court jurisdiction of 
the cause. When in such case the judgment is held void or 
modified or whatever order may be made therein by the 
appellate or reviewing court, the ruling is made on the 
record of the proceedings in the cause itself; and, when on 
remittitur the case is remanded to the lower court in which 
the void judgment was rendered, with directions, the lower 
court is again vested with jurisdiction to proceed in the 
cause in accordance with the remittitur. Hence, in such 
case, no matter what time may have elapsed from the rendi-
tion of the judgment in the court below until it was annulled 
or vacated by the appellate court and the case remanded to 
the lower court, that court is again vested with jurisdiction 
of the case to proceed in accordance with the remittitur. 
In the prevailing opinion, it is said that, had a direct appeal 
been taken from the judgment which on appeal had been 
declared void and the case remanded to the court below, with 
directions to render another and a valid judgment or other-
wise to proceed in accordance with the remittitur, the lower 
court would have had jurisdiction to so proceed, and there-
fore it is assumed that the district court likewise had juris-
diction of the cause and of the parties when more than three 
years after the void judgment was rendered and partly 
executed it on habeas corpus proceedings was declared void. 
The conclusion does not follow for the reason and as is 
well stated by Justice Van Syckel in the case of State v. 
Gray, 37 N. J. Law, 368, that in habeas corpus proceedings 
the writ "does not bring up the record of the proceedings 
and judgment below for review; it operates only on the body 
of the defendant and raises the single question whether he 
96 SUPREME COURT OF UTAH [February 
State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68 
is legally in custody"; that the court can simply declare 
that by virtue of the illegal sentence the defendant cannot 
longer be restrained of his liberty and that the void judg-
ment is no warrant for restraining the defendant in custody; 
and, inasmuch as the cause itself and the record of its 
proceedings in which the judgment was rendered is not be-
fore the court granting the writ, that court may not pass 
on or render a new judgment, nor direct the court below 
to do so, nor remand the prisoner to the court below when 
the term at which the void judgment was entered had 
ended or the judgment partly executed. Such views are 
also supported by the cases of State v. Addnf, 43 N. J. Law 
113, 39 Am. Rep. 547; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 
L, Ed. 872; Com. v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317, 23 Am. Rep. 
326, and cases hereinafter cited. 
Such also in effect is the rule stated by Works on Courts 
and Their Jurisdiction, p. 121, where he says: 
"Where a judgment is void on its face, the court has inherent power 
to set it aside, upon a proper showing-, and the statutes authorizing 
a motion to vacate within a limited time are usually held not to affect 
this power. But the question sometimes arises whether, after a long 
space of time has intervened, the judgment can be vacated on motion, 
or whether it is not necessary to bring suit for that purpose. The 
right to obtain such relief by motion has been upheld; but the better 
rule seems to be that no such motion can properly be entertained after 
the term, or where the time within which to move is fixed by law, 
after the time limited—and that, after that time, an action is neces-
sary. It must not be understood from this, however, that a court is 
bound, after the term, to enforce a void judgment. I t has control over 
its process, and may decline to allow it to be used to execute such a 
judgment, and may arrest its process when issued thereon." 
On reflection I think it clear that in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, unaided by certiorari or other proceedings of re-
view, wherein the defendant or prisoner is held illegally 
imprisoned or restrained and discharged because of a void 
or unauthorized judgment, that jurisdiction of the cause 
itself in which the judgment was rendered is not transferred 
to the court releasing or discharging the prisoner so as to 
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give it jurisdiction to itself pronounce a judgment in the 
cause or to direct the court in which the void judgment 
was rendered to do so and as may be done on appeal or 
writ of error. 
A habeas corpus proceeding is civil and not criminal in 
its nature. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174, 27 S. Ct. 135, 51 
L. Ed. 142, 7 Ann. Cas. 1019, and note, page 1020. It is a 
collateral and not a direct attack upon the judgment, except 
where, as in the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
writ is issued in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and 
is accompanied by a writ of certiorari to bring up the 
records and proceedings of the inferior court. Note, 23 Am. 
St. Rep. 108; 12 R. C. L. 1184, 1196. The existence of 
another remedy does not preclude a resort to the writ to 
obtain relief from illegal detention. 12 R. C. L. 1188. It 
is not a proceeding in the criminal action in which the 
judgment was rendered. It is a new suit brought by the 
defendant to enforce a civil right of personal liberty. 12 
R. C. L. 1184. To render a judgment immune from attack, 
the court must have had, not only jurisdiction of the sub-
ject-matter and of person, but also authority to render the 
particular judgment in question, and, if either of these ele-
ments is wanting, the judgment is void and open to collateral 
attack and one restrained thereunder entitled to be dis-
charged. 12 R. C. L. 1197. 
In some of the cited cases in the prevailing opinion, where 
on habeas corpus proceeding the defendant or the prisoner 
was held illegally restrained or imprisoned on a void or 
unauthorized judgment, and released and discharged from 
custody and remanded to the inferior or lower court in which 
the void judgment was rendered to pronounce a valid judg-
ment, such mandate was made without considering or dis-
cussing whether such inferior or lower court still had juris-
diction and custody of the cause and of the parties in which 
the void judgment was rendered. Such is evident from the 
case of In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958, and in other cited 
cases where such an order of remand was made. In other 
4 
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words, in such case the jurisdiction of the court below was 
merely assumed. As already suggested, we in the habeas 
corpus proceedings were urged to determine and hold that 
the district court still had jurisdiction of the cause and of 
the parties, and still was authorized and had jurisdiction 
to render a new and another judgment in the cause, and to 
remand the defendant to that court to render another judg-
ment as was done In re Lee, supra, and in other similar 
cases, but we declined in such particular to follow such 
cases, and refused to so remand the defendant to the court 
below, and declined even to express an opinion as to whether 
that court still had or had not jurisdiction of the cause and 
of the defendant to render another or a new judgment, then 
believing that we did not have jurisdiction of the cause itself 
in which the void judgment was rendered, and hence had 
no legal authority to remand the defendant to the court be-
low, and thus absolutely released and discharged the prisoner 
from custody, without prejudice to the rights of the state 
to take whatever lawful measures it might have to resume 
or acquire jurisdiction of the defendant. In such particular 
we but did what was done in the cited case of In re Bonner, 
151 U. S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149, and made the 
same kind of order as was therein made. And in harmony 
therewith in the concurring opinion it was stated that upon 
the petitioner's discharge it would be time enough to de-
termine, what, if any, proceedings may be had in the dis-
trict court in the cause in which the judgment was rendered 
to have another judgment rendered and entered, when such 
proceedings were had and our review sought of them. But 
now In re Lee, supra, and other cases of similar holdings 
cited in the dissenting opinion on the habeas corpus pro-
ceedings are here recited in the prevailing opinion, where 
in habeas corpus proceedings the defendant or prisoner, 
on being released and discharged from imprisonment on a 
void judgment, was remanded to the lower court to pro-
nounce a valid judgment, and hence we on the habeas corpus 
proceedings ought to have done, but did not do, so. In fact, 
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the dissenting members took the view that, though the de-
fendant was imprisoned and held in custody by the warden 
on a void judgment, he nevertheless was not entitled to a 
discharge or release, but that the warden should be directed 
to deliver him over to the county sheriff to abide the further 
judgment of the district court, without considering what, 
if any, right or authority the sheriff had to receive or hold 
the defendant, or the district court to render a new or 
another judgment, in support of which the cases cited in the 
dissenting opinion are now here recited in the prevailing 
opinion. If it be intended to indicate or hold that the views 
expressed and the conclusion reached by the dissenting 
members in the habeas corpus proceeding were right, and 
those of the majority wrong, and that those of the dissent-
ing members should now prevail, then why not overrule the 
holding of the majority in the habeas corpus proceedings 
and be done with it. 
However, as heretofore suggested, we are now confronted 
with the real question of jurisdiction of the court below. 
While, as has been seen, a judgment void on its face may 
at any time be vacated or expunged, yet such action or 
motion, strictly speaking, is not a proceeding in the action, 
but is a mere application to have the records purged of an 
unauthorized and illegal entry. Mueller v. Reimer, 46 Minn. 
314, 48 N. W. 1120. When that is done, whether the court 
still has jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties to enter 
a new or another judgment or to further proceed in the case 
is quite another question. Though a court at some stage of 
the proceedings of a cause may have had full jurisdiction of 
subject-matter and of the person, yet at some subsequent 
stage may lose or may have lost both. 1 Freeman on Judg-
ments (5th Ed.) p. 729. If, when a void judgment is ex-
punged or vacated, the court still has jurisdiction or custody 
of the cause and of the parties, and its action properly in-
voked, it may readily be conceded that the court has juris-
diction to render a new or another judgment. If, however, 
the court has lost jurisdiction of the cause, he cannot do so. 
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Because a court at some stage of the proceedings had 
jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the parties when the 
void judgment was rendered and entered, it does not follow 
that the court for all time thereafter retained jurisdiction of 
the cause and of the parties to render a new or another 
judgment. That, I think, is the effect of the holding in 
this jurisdiction. In re Flint, 25 Utah 388, 71 P. 531, 95 
Am. St. Rep. 853, the defendant on February 25, 1902, was 
convicted of the crime of forgery. The time for sentence 
was fixed March 5, and was continued to March 12. At that 
time the court suspended sentence indefinitely, and per-
mitted the defendant to go on his own recognizance. On 
December 5, on motion of the district attorney, the court 
ordered the defendant to appear January 5, 1903, for sen-
tence. At that time, and over objections of the defendant 
that the court had lost jurisdiction, the court sentenced him 
to the state prison for a term of one year. On habeas 
corpus proceedings, this court held that the court, though 
it had jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties when 
the order or judgment of suspension was rendered, yet was 
unauthorized to indefitely suspend sentence as was done, 
and that, when the court did so, and permitted the defen-
dant to go on his own recognizance, the court lost jurisdic-
tion over him, and that all subsequent proceedings were 
unauthorized to indefinitely suspend sentence as was done, 
that the order or judgment of suspension was merely er-
roneous, but was unauthorized, and that it was not within 
the power of the court to render such a judgment, and that 
the court eleven months thereafter and after term time had 
lost jurisdiction to render a new or another judgment. That 
case is a leading case on the subject. It is cited with ap-
proval in many cases both of state and of federal courts. 
To the same effect, among others, are the following cases, 
in many of which the Flint Case is cited with approval: 
People v. Leinecke, 290 111. 560, 125 N. E. 513; People v. 
Barrett 202 111. 287, 67 N. E. 23, 63 L. R. A. 82, 95 Am. 
St. Rep. 230; Ex parte Singer (C. C. A.) 284 F. 60; Grundel 
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V. People, 33 Colo. 191, 79 P. 1022, 108 Am. St. Rep. 75; 
Collins V. State, 24 Okl. Cr. 117, 217 P. 896; Com, v. Morgan, 
278 Pa. 395, 123 A. 337: Smith v. State, 188 Ind. 64, 121 
N. E. 829, 3 A. L. R. 999; United States V. Wilson (C. C.) 46 
F. 748; Mintie V. Biddle (C. C. A.) 15 F. (2d.) 931, 933, 
where cases are cited from many different jurisdictions. 
These cases proceed on the theory that, in the absence 
of a statute, the court is without authority and without 
jurisdiction to render a judgment suspending sentence or 
indefinitely to defer sentence, that such a judgment is void 
and of no force or effect, and that thereafter the court after 
term time lost jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties 
to render a new or another judgment in the cause. Such 
a judgment so rendered without authority or power is just 
as much a void judgment and a nullity as is the first judg-
ment here rendered imprisoning the defendant in the state 
prison for an indeterminate sentence. The one is no more 
a mere erroneous judgment than is the other. Both involve 
the authority and power of the court to render the judg-
ment. If the legal effect of the one is as though no judg-
ment was pronounced or rendered, such, too, is the legal 
effect of the other. Both were held void because the court 
had no power or authority to render the judgment. Hence 
the Flint Case and the rule therein announced supported by, 
and, as in Mintie v. Biddle, supra, stated to be, the great 
weight of authority, may not be disposed of by the mere as-
sertion that it involved a judgment or order of a suspension 
of sentence or of indefinitely postponing a sentence. Fun-
damentally the proposition lies deeper than that. The ad-
ministration of the criminal law requires a court to pro-
nounce judgment when and as by law provided. That must 
be done as by the statute and the Code prescribed. The court 
may not lawfully pronounce a binding judgment otherwise. 
Whenever a judgment in a criminal case is rendered, the 
court must be able to point to some provision of law author-
izing the court to do so. If a court does not fix a day for 
judgment within ten days after verdict or plea of guilt and 
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at such appointed time render a judgment as by sections 
9041 and 9051 provided, the court nevertheless is required 
to render judgment within the term at which, or at least 
within a reasonable time after, the verdict was rendered 
or plea of guilt entered, unless on motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment or postponement of sentence or for other 
cause the case is continued for further proceedings, and the 
defendant by recognizance or otherwise still held amenable 
to orders and process of the court After all that, and after 
a case is finally disposed of and no appeal or writ of error 
or review taken and no stay of judgment had, the court loses 
jurisdiction of the cause and of the defendant, and may not 
years thereafter render a new or another judgment, espe-
cially after the first judgment has partly been executed. 
There is no halo in a void judgment It is nothing. It is as 
though no judgment had been pronounced or rendered. Cer-
tainly, if the court here had pronounced or rendered no 
judgment, and the proceedings in the cause after verdict or 
plea of guilt in no particular postponement continued or ar-
rested, and the defendant no longer in the custody of the 
court, no one would hardly contend that the court more 
than three years thereafter still had jurisdiction of the cause 
and of the parties to pronounce a valid judgment in the 
cause. To so contend is, as it seems to me, to go back to the 
"reign of James I., when he sent Sir Walter Raleigh to the 
block 15 years after his conviction." People v. ReUlyf 53 
Mich. 260, 18 N. W. 849, 850. 
In the prevailing opinion it is said that the defendant 
was the actor setting in motion the habeas corpus proceed-
ings by which the judgment was declared void and the de-
fendant released and discharged. What if he did? He had 
the undoubted right to initiate such proceedings. It was 
not his fault that the void judgment was rendered against 
him. It was the fault of the state, the fault of the district 
attorney, the fault of the court. In no sense may it be said 
that, because the defendant failed to prosecute a direct ap-
peal from the void judgment, or did not sooner seek his 
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release from the illegal imprisonment, he is now estopped 
from challenging the jurisdiction of the court to pronounce 
the new or further judgment which was rendered against 
him. For more than three years he was wholly without the 
custody of the court and in the custody of the warden of 
the state prison under a commitment of a void judgment 
sentencing him to imprisonment for an indefinite period 
between ten years and his natural life. After the commit-
ment was issued, the defendant delivered to the warden, and 
after the defendant had served more than three years in 
execution of the judgment, it is difficult to perceive how 
the case during all such period still was pending in the 
district court or the defendant still in the custody of the 
court, and more difficult is it to perceive that the defendant, 
by seeking and being granted his release from illegal im-
prisonment and custody, thereby conferred jurisdiction on 
the court below in which the void judgment was rendered 
to resume jurisdiction which theretofore clearly had been 
lost. 
The effective administration of the criminal law requires, 
when one pleads guilty or is convicted of crime, judgment 
to be promptly and certainly rendered as by the statute and 
Code provided; and, where the court through no fault or 
act of the defendant fails to render a judgment, or where 
the court itself in no particular invited or induced to do so 
by any act of the defendant renders a void judgment which 
in legal effect is a nullity, and as though no judgment had 
been rendered, all proceedings in the cause wholly and 
finally ended, the jurisdiction of the court in the cause 
exhausted, the defendant no longer in the custody of the 
court, the term at which the judgment was rendered wholly 
ended, and numerous subsequent terms come and gone, and 
the judgment partly executed, the court may not years 
thereafter, with no further or other proceedings invoking 
and conferring jurisdiction, render and enter a new or 
another judgment. As said by the court in Mintie v. Biddle, 
supra: 
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"Obviously, the matter of the furtherance of the administration of 
justice is not a unilateral one. The accused is due some modicum of 
consideration. It is not alone the ends and accommodation of the gov-
ernment which are to be considered and subserved; but those of the 
defendant as well." 
Cases are cited where, in the prosecution of a cause, a 
void judgment was rendered, and because thereof the ac-
cused again prosecuted on a new cause or proceeding for 
the same offense, and where it was held that the void judg-
ment of the first cause was not a bar to the prosecution in 
the second cause or proceeding, and could not be interposed 
as once in jeopardy. I think it apparent such cases have 
here no application. There, jurisdiction in the second cause 
or proceeding was not acquired or exercised by or through 
the first cause or proceeding, but in spite of it. In other 
words, the jurisdiction acquired was in virtue of the new 
and not of the old proceeding. The state, when it initiated 
or instituted the new or second proceeding, may well have 
done so because of a prerequisite to again clothe the court 
with jurisdiction lost by it in the first cause or proceeding. 
There no judgment was rendered in the first cause or pro-
ceeding resulting in the void judgment but in the second 
cause or proceeding. In the case in hand no proceedings 
in a new case were instituted or initiated, nor even in the 
cause in which the void judgment was rendered. The state, 
without any such proceedings, more than three years after 
the void judgment was rendered, rearrested the accused and 
summarily caused the second judgment to be rendered. It 
did so on the theory that, when a court once having had 
jurisdiction of a cause and of the parties, and though a 
final judgment was rendered disposing of the case, the 
parties sent out of court, and the custody of the cause sur-
rendered and no review thereof prosecuted in the cause or 
other proceedings had therein with respect thereto, yet, 
if in another and independent cause between different par-
ties wherein the validity of the judgment is brought in 
question and by a court of competent jurisdiction held void, 
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the court rendering the void judgment, regardless of time 
and of its part execution, retained a continuing jurisdiction 
of the cause in which the judgment was rendered, and, with-
out any new or other proceedings had therein, was clothed 
with power to render a new and another judgment. I cannot 
yield assent to such a doctrine. 
If because of views herein expressed it be thought the 
defendant ultimately may go without adequate punishment, 
let the fault rest where it belongs—on the state, the district 
attorney, and the court. To meet or prevent consequences 
of such remisses does not justify a stretching of the statute 
and the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor a misapplication 
of fundamental principles of jurisdiction. I think the Flint 
Case ought to be followed, and the second judgment here, 
as it was there, declared a nullity. 
Having reached such conclusion, it is unnecessary to con-
sider the ruling refusing the defendant to withdraw his plea 
of guilty and enter one of not guilty and grant a new trial, 
except to make the observation that, while on the record it 
is not shown that the plea of guilty was entered through 
misapprehension, undue influence, coercion, or promise, 
neither is it shown that, in the event a new trial had been 
granted, the evidence of the state because of lapse of time 
no longer was available or that the state otherwise could not 
properly have presented its cause as it might have done 
had the plea of guilty not been entered. No claim was made 
by the state that its evidence no longer was available. It 
merely urged that the statute permitting a withdrawal of 
a plea of guilty before judgment was not mandatory, only 
discretionary, and should not now be permitted. With re-
spect thereto, the court merely observed that, in order that 
the question may be settled by the Supreme Court, "the 
court will deny the right of the defendant to at this time 
withdraw his plea and to which you may have your excep-
tion." The withdrawal was not denied because of an in-
sufficient showing or because to grant it would have been 
to the prejudice of the state. It was denied to let the Su-
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are thus stated in the opinion: 
"On the 25th day o r r , 1902, the defendant in this case 
was duly convicted in the Second judicial district court of this state 
of the crime of forgery. The court made an order directing the de-
fendant to appear March 5, 1902, for sentence. The case was again 
continued, and March 12, 1902, was fixed as the time for pronouncing 
judgment. The defendant appeared for sentence on the last-mentioned 
date, and the court, on its own motion, made and entered the following 
order: 'The defendant having been convicted of the crime of forgery, 
and being now before the court to receive sentence, and the court 
being sufficiently advised, it is ordered tha t sentence be, and the 
same is hereby, suspended, and the defendant permitted to go upon his 
own recognizance/ The defendant, by this order, was, in effect, dis-
charged from custody. On the 5th day of December, 1902, the judg* 
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before whom the defendant was tried and convicted made and entered 
the following" order in the case: 'On motion of A, B. Hayes, Esq., 
district attorney, it is ordered that said defendant appear before the 
court for sentence on Monday, January 6, 1903/ On January 5, 1903, 
the time for fixing" sentence was continued until January 12, 1903, on 
which date the defendant appeared in court, and duly objected to 
any further proceedings in the premises on the ground that the court 
had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant The court over-
ruled the objection, and sentenced the defendant to the state prison 
for a term of one year, and made an order duly committing him to 
the proper officers, with directions that the judgment be enforced." 
Lee Lim was sentenced on October 13, 1926, to an in-
determinate term in the state prison after he had entered a 
plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the second degree. 
On October 15, 1926, he was delivered to the warden of the 
state prison of Utah, where he remained confined until, on 
habeas corpus proceedings, he was ordered discharged by 
an opinion of this court filed on December 31, 1929. After 
he was discharged and released, a warrant of arrest was 
issued out of the district court of Salt Lake county, and 
he was arrested. On February 1, 1930, he was brought be-
fore the district court of Salt Lake county. The state re-
quested that a time be fixed for passing sentence. The de-
fendant through his counsel resisted the passing of sentence 
upon the ground that the court had lost jurisdiction. The 
objection was overruled. On February 15, 1930, the district 
court sentenced the defendant to serve ten years in the state 
prison of Utah, the period to begin as of October 13, 1926. 
It will readily be noted that the facts in the Flint Case 
and the facts in the instant case are in several respects 
quite unlike, but it does not follow that the Flint Case is 
not a precedent, and, as such, controlling in this case. The 
test of whether a prior case is a precedent in a subsequent 
case must be determined from a comparison, consideration, 
and a determination of whether or not the underlying prin-
ciples of law of the two cases are the same, and not from 
a superficial comparison of the facts in the two cases. The 
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pertinent inquiry here presented is, "Why had the court 
jurisdiction to resentence Lim when it did not have jurisdic-
tion to sentence Flint? If the time which elapsed between 
the verdict or plea of guilty and the imposing of sentence 
is of importance in determining the question of whether the 
court did, or did not, have jurisdiction to impose the sen-
tence here complained of, then clearly there is greater reason 
for holding that the court was without jurisdiction to sen-
tence Lim than there was in holding that the court was 
without jurisdiction to sentence Flint. Approximately three 
years and four months elapsed between the time that Lee 
Lim entered his plea of guilty and the time that the sentence 
here involved was imposed upon him. Approximately ten 
and one-half months elapsed between the time that Richard 
Flint was found guilty and the date when the sentence, 
which this court held to be a nullity because the court had 
lost jurisdiction, was imposed upon him. If prejudice, sus-
tained by a delay in imposing sentence, is to be of controlling 
importance, one who is merely held in suspense and uncer-
tainty for a period of ten and one-half months, as in the 
Flint Case, has less cause to complain than does one who is 
imprisoned for three years and four months, as in the case 
of Lim. 
It is said in the prevailing opinion that we need not con-
sider whether it was proper for the trial court to fix the 
commencement of the term that the defendant should serve 
as October 13, 1926, the day the void sentence was pro-
nounced, because "the defendant is not complaining of this 
part of the sentence, and indeed it is as favorable to him as 
he could hope for. Neither has the state complained of this 
feature of the sentence/' If it be assumed that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to impose a sentence upon Lim, then 
the sentence imposed was "as favorable to him as he could 
hope for," but, if the court was without jurisdiction to im-
pose any term of imprisonment on the defendant, then, and 
in such case, he had a right to hope for and receive a more 
favorable result, viz.: a discharge. Nor does the fact that 
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the state is not complaining affect the question of whether 
the trial court did or did not have jurisdiction to impose the 
sentence here under review. If the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to pronounce any sentence upon the defendant, 
the failure of the state to complain of the sentence imposed 
cannot be said to confer such jurisdiction. It is by no means 
clear, as is apparently assumed in the prevailing opinion, 
that the legal effect of the sentence here under review 
entitles Lim to credit for the time he served under the void 
sentence. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 8531, provides that 
"the term of imprisonment fixed by the judgment in a 
criminal action commences to run only upon the actual de-
livery of the defendant at the place of imprisonment. * * *" 
The law applicable generally to the commencement and 
duration of imprisonment under a sentence is thus stated 
i n l 6 C . J. p. 1304: 
"As a rule, the duration of imprisonment must be stated clearly 
and definitely, although it has been held that, where the period of 
imprisonment is definitely fixed by statute such period need not be 
specified in the sentence. As a general rule, the time for imprison-
ment to commence or to be inflicted is no part of the judgment or 
sentence proper, and according to the weight of authority, in the ab-
sence of a statute requiring it, the time when the imprisonment is to 
begin or end need not be specified in the sentence, it being sufficient 
to state merely its duration." 
If the time fixed by the trial court for the sentence of 
the defendant to begin be regarded as no part of the sen-
tence, and if the sentence "commences to run only upon the 
actual delivery of the defendant at the place of imprison-
ment," it is difficult to see how Lim may avail himself of 
any deduction for the term served under the void sentence. 
Assuming, however, that Lim may take advantage of the 
deduction attempted to be given him by the sentence here 
under review, still he had no legal right to have the time 
which he served under the void sentence deducted from the 
time which he may have been required to serve under the 
present sentence. The law applicable in such a case as 
this is thus stated in 16 C. J. p. 1373: 
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"Where defendant is confined in the penitentiary under a void or 
erroneous sentence because of his failure to obtain a suspension of 
his sentence during the pendency of proceedings in error, it is in no 
sense a part execution of a legal sentence, and by the rendition and 
execution of a legal judgment he is not punished twice for the same 
offense, 
"A person released under a writ of habeas corpus after having 
served a part of a sentence of imprisonment imposed under a void 
indictment is not entitled to have the time so served credited on a 
sentence subsequently imposed under a valid indictment." 
The following cases support the view that time served 
under a void sentence is no part of, and may not be deducted 
from, time served under a subsequent valid sentence. Ex 
parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 496, 69 So. 442; McCormick V. State, 
71 Nev. 505, 99 N. W. 237; Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 
219, 63 S. W. 1009,96 Am. S t Rep. 860,15 Am. Cr. Rep. 321. 
The great weight of judicial authority is to the effect that, 
in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, there 
is no legal authority for a court to deduct time served un-
der a void sentence from the time to be served under a sub-
sequent sentence. 
When the defendant in this case was taken before the 
district court on February 15, 1930, for sentence, the case 
there stood against him on his plea of guilty, which was 
entered in October, 1926. The fact that the learned trial 
judge fixed the period of defendant's imprisonment to begin 
as of October 13, 1926, does not alter the case. That the 
trial court could properly have fixed the time of the begin-
ning of the sentence here under review as of the date that 
the sentence was imposed is clear. That it was error to fix 
(assuming that the legal effect of the sentence does fix) 
the time that the defendant must serve to begin on October 
13,1926 (the date of the void sentence), would seem equally 
clear. If Lim was without right to have the time he served 
under the void sentence deducted from the sentence in ques-
tion, then it would seem to necessarily follow that the court 
below was in error in making such deduction. The grant-
ing or refusing to grant a deduction for time served under 
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a void sentence is purely a question of law, and may not 
well be said to be a question which merely appeals to the 
discretion of the court. If the court below had authority 
to either deduct, or refuse to deduct, the time which Lim 
served under the void sentence from the time that he should 
serve under the sentence here in question, nevertheless the 
fact remains that the delay of the court in imposing a valid 
sentence was prejudicial to him. There still remained the 
hazard that he would be compelled to serve full time without 
any deduction for the time served under the void sentence. 
Such a hazard is certainly as great a cause for complaint 
by Lim as was the suspense and uncertainty which Flint 
sustained because of the delay in imposing sentence upon 
him. By granting the defendant Lim credit for time served 
under the void sentence, it would seem that the sentence 
under review of necessity recognized the validity of the prior 
sentence to the extent of the time actually served. The de-
fendant thus is placed in a position analogous, if not identi-
cal, to that of one who has served the valid part of a sentence 
which is in part void. It is quite generally, if not uniformly, 
held to be the law that, where a court imposes a sentence, 
part of which is valid and part of which is void, such court 
is without jurisdiction to amend the sentence so imposed 
after the defendant has entered upon the execution of the 
valid part. If a person is once legally punished for a crime, 
he may not again be punished for the same crime. To hold 
otherwise would be to disregard both our state and Federal 
Constitution, which directs that no man can be twice law-
fully punished for the same offense. A number of cases so 
holding are cited in the prevailing opinion, among them 
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872. 
If the trial court had erroneously sentenced Lee Lim to 
serve three years and four months in the state prison, and 
if he had served the whole of such sentence, he would have 
been entitled to a discharge, and, under the authorities, the 
trial court would be without jurisdiction to impose addi-
tional punishment. In the supposed case there would be 
t 
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the same miscarriage of justice that the prevailing opinion 
suggests would follow a discharge of the defendant in this 
case, and yet the court in the supposed case would be power-
less to do anything in the premises. As a matter of even-
handed justice, the defendant in the supposed case is en-
titled to no better treatment at the hands of the state than 
is the defendant in the instant case. In the supposed case 
as in this case the fault lies with those whose duty it is 
to enforce and administer the law. If either the state or 
the defendant must suffer because of such fault, it should 
be the state and not the defendant. The miscarriage of jus-
tice that would follow from the immediate discharge of the 
defendant resulting in his serving two years and six months 
less than the term which he should serve under his sentence 
of ten years (assuming his behavior while imprisoned is 
such as to entitle him to the benefits of section 4331, Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917) is not cured or rendered any the less a 
miscarriage of justice by taking the other horn of the 
dilemma and thus require him to serve three years and four 
months more than the term for which he was sentenced. 
A sentence or judgment may be void, and as such open 
to attack either collaterally or directly. It may be valid and 
thus not vulnerable to attack either collaterally or directly. 
It may be voidable or erroneous, so that it cannot withstand 
a direct attack but can withstand a collateral attack. The 
authorities generally recognize these three classes of judg-
ments or sentences, and none other. The sentence under 
review, in order to escape the injustice of requiring the de-
fendant to serve three years and four months in the state 
prison without a deduction therefor, seems to proceed upon 
the theory that the original sentence had some legal ex-
istence, apparently that of being voidable or erroneous. 
Having thus, to that extent, protected the defendant, the 
sentence then seems to proceed upon the theory that the 
original sentence was void, and therefore the court had 
jurisdiction to impose another sentence. It is one of the 
characteristics of our system of jurisprudence that funda-
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mental principles of law may not be disregarded in order 
that the exigencies of a given case may be met. An adher-
ence to such principles is necessary to the orderly adminis-
tration of the law. Courts refuse to recognize a hybrid 
sentence which for one purpose is voidable or erroneous and 
for another purpose is void. A sentence cannot be wholly 
void and at the same time be merely erroneous or voidable. 
The fact that a sentence is void precludes it from being void-
able or valid. 
In the habeas corpus proceeding the original sentence im-
posed upon Lim was held to be void. As such, it has no 
existence in contemplation of law. Upon principle I am 
unable to perceive how a void sentence may serve the pur-
pose of indefinitely enabling a court to retain jurisdiction 
to impose a valid sentence when, as in the Flint Case, the 
court lost jurisdiction to impose any sentence because it 
ordered that sentence be "suspended and the defendant per-
mitted to go upon his recognizance." 
It is said in the prevailing opinion that in the Flint Case 
"the trial court reached the conclusion that the defendant 
should not be made to suffer for his crime the punishment 
provided by statute, at least not presently or during good 
behavior, and thereupon suspended the imposition of sen-
tence and discharged the defendant." The order in the Flint 
Case was that "the defendant having been convicted of the 
crime of forgery, and being now before the court to receive 
sentence, and the court being sufficiently advised, it is 
ordered that sentence be, and the same is hereby, suspended, 
and the defendant permitted to go upon his own recogni-
zance." As I understand the language just quoted, it does 
not justify the statement that the trial court reached the 
conclusion that the defendant should not be made to suffer 
for his own crime or that the trial court intended to per-
manently discharge the defendant. The fact that the trial 
court later attempted to impose a sentence upon the defen-
dant would tend to indicate that all the trial court intended 
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to do was to temporarily suspend sentence. When the orig-
inal sentence was imposed upon the defendant in the instant 
case, there can be no doubt but the trial court intended to 
place him beyond its jurisdiction. The sheriff was ordered 
to deliver the defendant to the warden of the state prison. 
So far as the trial court was concerned, the case against 
Lee Lim was a closed book as soon as Lim was delivered to 
the warden of the state prison. Those who are confined in 
the state prison are in no sense within the jurisdiction of 
the various courts which sentenced them. On the contrary, 
they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of those whose 
duty it is to administer the affairs of that institution. Nor 
can it be said that a delay of three years and four months 
is a reasonable delay between the plea of guilty and the 
imposition of the sentence in the instant case, and that a 
delay of ten and one-half months between the verdict of 
guilty and the imposition of sentence was an unreasonable 
delay in the Flint Case. I can perceive of no just or reason-
able excuse for holding that the court retained jurisdiction 
of the defendant in this case for the purpose of imposing 
sentence upon him and at the same time adhering to the 
rule announced by this Court in the Flint Case. From what-
ever angle this case is viewed, the only conclusion permissible 
in the light of the law announced in the Flint Case is that 
the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the sen-
tence here complained of. There are cases which reach a 
different result, and there were such cases at the time the 
Flint Case was decided. In addition to the cases cited in the 
prevailing opinion and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Straup herein, a list of cases dealing with the ques-
tion here presented will be found collected in the case of 
Mackelprang v. Walker, supra. It may be that the court, 
as at present constituted, would have reached a different 
result had they participated in the Flint Case, but, unless 
we are thoroughly convinced that the Flint Case is wrong, 
I think we should follow the law as there announced. The 
construction placed upon a statute by a court should not be 
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•ejected merely to conform to the views of a changed per-
sonnel of the court. 
Our Code of Criminal Procedure, title 120, chap. 37, Laws 
of Utah 1917 (section 9041 et seq.), fixes the time within 
which a court shall pronounce judgment after a plea or 
verdict of guilty. Since the Flint Case was decided, Febru-
ary 13, 1903, Legislatures have come and gone, but no 
amendment has been made in the statute with respect to 
the time within which the court shall pronounce judgment 
after a plea or verdict of guilty. This is not a case where 
the court exercised, or attempted to exercise, the power to 
suspend sentence as provided for in chapter 74, Laws of 
Utah 1923. The Legislature is apparently satisfied with 
the construction of the statute relating to the time when 
judgment or sentence shall be imposed in a criminal case as 
announced in the Flint Case, and therefore, as I think, this 
court should be content with such construction. 
I am of the opinion that the judgment and sentence ap-
pealed from should be reversed, and the defendant dis-
charged. 
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